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1. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s have seen United States policy gradually retreat from
the trend, traceable from the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization Convention of 1970 ("UNESCO Conven-
tion") through the much-discussed McClain decisions1 of 1979, toward
* J.D., 1990, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 1983, Harvard
University.
1 The McClain case resulted in two proceedings and two appeals, United States v.
McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977),
and United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). In the first appeal, the
defendants were convicted of theft under the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2314, 2315 (1970 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter NSPA], for dealing in pre-Columbian
objects exported from Mexico in violation of Mexican law purporting to vest title to all
such property in the Mexican government. Articulating the theory underlying the con-
victions, the court reasoned that, for purposes of the NSPA, which forbids the transpor-
tation in interstate commerce or the receipt of stolen goods, illegally exported artifacts
subject to such a national declaration of ownership are "stolen." The second McClain
appeal resulted in a reversal of the substantive NSPA conviction (although the court of
appeals sustained convictions for conspiracy) on the grounds that the particular statute
upon which the Mexican government based its claim was too vague to satisfy United
States constitutional standards for criminal proceedings. However, the decision left open
the possibility that a person might be convicted under the NSPA for conduct like that
of the McClain defendants under similar circumstances. (Indeed, the court implied that
in McClain itself the United States Department of Justice might have secured a convic-
tion had it rested its case on another, more recent Mexican statute than the one actually
relied upon by the prosecution. McAlee, From the Boston Raphael to Peruvian Pots:
Limitations on the Importation of Art Into the United States, 85 DicK. L. Rxv. 565,
584 (1981) [hereinafter McAlee, From the Boston Raphael] (citing McClain, 593 F.2d
at 662). See generally P. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 74-78 (1983)
(possible negative consequences of McClain in criminal and civil suits involving ex-
ported cultural property reposing in the United States); Fitzpatrick, A Wayward
Course: The Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural Properties, 15 N.Y.U. J. Irr'L
L. & POL. 857, 873-74 (1983) (problems raised by McClain); McAlee, supra, at 578-
99 (critical discussion of McClain cases and their consequences); Note, The Current
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enormous - almost complete - deference to foreign parties com-
plaining of having been unjustly stripped of culturally significant prop-
erty.2 In the wake of the current explosion in the worldwide market for
art and antiquities, 3 as well as the soaring popularity of art objects as
economic investments4 rather than pieces intended primarily for sensory
delectation, the United States appears to have reawakened to its own
national interests and, perhaps, been jolted into appreciating the tenu-
ousness of its long-held status as a central participant in the flourishing
art trade.5
The present Comment will attempt to demonstrate how recent de-
velopments in United States statutory and decisional law have brought
the United States closer than at any point in the past two decades to
establishing a coherent policy with respect to its position in the world
art market. This convergence in the United States' legislative and judi-
cial treatment of disputes involving the international movement of cul-
tural property seems to portend a practical resolution to the problem of
conflicting national policies with which United States courts and legis-
Status of the International Art Trade, 10 SursoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 51, 76-79
(1986) [hereinafter Note, The Current Status] (legal and political difficulties raised by
McClain); see also McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs, and Congress, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 813 (1983) [hereinafter McAlee, The McClain Case]. But see Note,
Harmonious Meeting: The McClain Decision and the Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 311 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Harmonious Meeting].
I See P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 6-8 ("Throughout the 1970s developments in
the United States and the rest of the world responded to this heightened sense of con-
cern [about international commerce in art and antiquities, often looted or stolen, consti-
tuting part of an exporting country's national patrimony.]"); Merryman, Two Ways of
Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 831, 850 (1986) [hereinafter
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking] ("[1]n the 1970s and 1980s, the dialogue about
cultural property has become one-sided. Retentive nationalism [as opposed to cultural
pluralism] is strongly and confidently represented and supportively received wherever
international cultural property policy is made.").
I See, e.g., Reif, Records, Of Course, at the '88 Auctions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1989, at C1, col. 1; Reif, Auctions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at 033, col. 1.
4 See, e.g., Hughes, Art and Money: Who's Winning and Who's Losing as Prices
Go Through the Roof, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 64; Johnson, Art: Finding a Pot of
Gold in Paintings, MONEY, Aug. 1978, at 36, cited in Comment, The Recovery of
Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REv.
1122, 1123 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art]; Keresztes,
Your Money Matters: Collecting for Profit, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1978, at 34, col. 1,
cited in P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 15 n.41. Art sales through the world's largest
auction house, Sotheby's (formerly Sotheby Parke-Bernet), increased from $108 million
to $610 million between the 1971-72 season and the 1980-81 season. N.Y. Times, July
10, 1982, at 11, col. 1, cited in Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market: An Emerging
Duty of Care for Art Merchants, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443, 443 n.1 (1983) [herein-
after Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market].
5 The increase of art trade abroad, at the expense of the United States market, is
most vividly seen in the dramatic rise, over the past twenty-five years, of Japan as a
key center for international commerce in art. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 4, at 65.
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lators have sporadically struggled, often without focus, throughout this
nation's history' and more intensely over the past twenty years.
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
2.1. Policy Conflicts
At the heart of the problem lies the difficulty in attempting to rec-
oncile two fundamental desires of the United States government. On
one hand, the United States would like to maintain friendly diplomatic
relations with art exporting countries and to acknowledge the right of
each country to keep within its borders objects representative of its na-
tional patrimony. Doing so may require severe limits on the importa-
tion and trade in artworks in the United States. On the other hand,
United States policymakers would like to encourage free trade in works
of historical or aesthetic merit. A healthy art market stimulates the
American economy as well as makes the United States a repository for
works of beauty and cultural value originating in various lands.
7
2.2. Problems in Deterring Illegitimate Trade in Art
The challenge faced by the various branches of the United States
government - executive, legislative, and judicial - of curbing the ille-
gitimate art trade without inhibiting the flow of art through legitimate
commercial channels is especially thorny because there is often no clear
separation between the two markets.8 Second, determining which of
two or more conflicting parties has good title to a work of art obtained
through international trade is complicated by issues of interpretation
and conflict of laws9 whose resolution frequently bears on sensitive dip-
6 See generally Comment, The Evolution of American Attitudes and Laws Re-
garding Ethnic Art and Artifacts: From Cultural Imperialism to Cultural Pluralism,
9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Com'. L.J. 621 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, The Evolution of
American Attitudes].
' See generally Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 2 (extensive dis-
cussion of policies among various nations of "cultural nationalism," which, fearing "de-
contextualization," advocates the retention of cultural property by its country of origin,
or "cultural internationalism," which emphasizes the legitimacy of the international
movement of art and antiquities for scholarly and economic purposes); see also P. BA-
TOR, supra note 1, at 18-34 (consideration of values regarding cultural property lead-
ing to conclusion that, subject to certain qualifications, "there should be a large interna-
tional trade - at fair prices - in those nonmonumental art treasures whose export
does not jeopardize the legitimate cultural patrimony - that is, whose export will leave
standing a rich and representative collection at home"); Merryman, International Art
Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Common Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 757 (1983).
£ See infra text accompanying notes 34-36, 141.
o See, e.g., Kunstsammlung zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.
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lomatic relations between the United States and the exporting coun-
try.' 0 Third, even established principles of United States law (e.g.,
those embodied in the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code) are
difficult to apply where the basic assumptions of those rules, for exam-
ple, that title to an object is void because the work has been stolen, are
controverted. 1 Given these complications it is not hard to see why Con-
gress and the courts have for so long been unable to formulate a coher-
ent body of rules that might be applied to generate a satisfactory out-
come - fair to all the interests, private and public, international and
domestic - in almost every case.
3. NEW SOLUTIONS: BALANCING POLICY INTERESTS
In addition to according greater consideration to the United States'
own economic interests, the recent legal developments with which this
Comment deals give appropriate weight to the rights of foreign claim-
ants. These developments, including ratification of the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act 2 and the judicial balancing
process employed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the
important case of DeWeerth v. Baldinger,'3 complement American ef-
forts in both public and private arenas 4 to deter black market art
1982); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd and remanded,
693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982).
10 E.g., United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
" For instance, using the definition of "stolen property" adopted in McClain
could allow the Mexican government in a civil action for replevin to recover pre-Co-
lumbian works from a good-faith United States purchaser. P. BATOR, supra note 1, at
75-77. Otherwise, the bona fide buyer would be considered to have acquired good title
to the piece even were the seller-importer's title defective due to her violations of Mexi-
can export regulations or other claims to title by Mexico. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Cf Auto-
cephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (action by church and by Republic of Cyprus to
recover mosaics, in possession of United States art dealers, that had allegedly been re-
moved before sale to dealers in Switzerland from church in Turkish-occupied part of
Cyprus by Turkish agents); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. at 80 (action by art
dealer, good-faith purchaser of a painting, for breach of warranty of title under U.C.C.
§ 2-312, based on alleged cloud on title created by Italian government's claims resting
on assertion that painting had been exported by seller in violation of Italian law); At-
torney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, [1983] 2 W.L.R. 809, [1983] 2 All E.R. 93
(action in English court for return of unlawfully exported Maori artifact to which
government of New Zealand, unsuccessfully, claimed title).
12 See infra note 17.
13 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 2823, 100
L. Ed. 2d 924 (1988).
1I Examples of such efforts include: United States participation in bilateral and
multilateral international treaties, see generally Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and
Artifact: How Long Will the Art Market Continue to Benefit from Ineffective Laws
Governing Cultural Property?, 13 BROOKLYN J. IT'L L. 55, 60-68 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact]; informal dispute resolution and
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transactions1" and limit the wholesale pillage of culturally significant
objects from countries whose political or economic weakness may belie
their wealth in desirable works of art.'" Thus, the United States has
moved closer to a justly equilibrated foreign policy, supported by legal
actions demonstrating both internal and external consistency, with re-
gard to issues concerning the status of imported artworks.
3.1. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (here-
inafter CPIA), ratified in 1983 and effectuated in 1986,'17 has set a
course for judicial action in line with a national policy to advance
United States economic and cultural interests in addition to recognizing
the rights of other nations to preserve their cultural heritages.
The terms of the CPIA as enacted"8 embody Congress' intent to
preserve the central place of the United States in the burgeoning global
international diplomatic cooperation, see infra text accompanying notes 165-73 & note
173; legal regulation of the art trade at state and local levels, see sources cited infra
note 21, 160; and self-regulation by professional organizations, see infra note 172.
15 A more cautious approach toward foreign export restrictions will set the stage
for a healthy regulated, but not smothered, art trade in the United States. See P. BA-
TOR, supra note 1, at 41-43 ("The ineffectiveness of embargo: Ten easy lessons on how
to create a black market"); S. WnLwAms, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRO-
TEGTION OF MOVEABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY 126 (1978) (administration of rigid
export controls encourages illegal activity); Prott, International Control of Illicit Move-
ment of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and Some Possible
Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 333, 334 (1983) (less stringent import
regulations allow the legitimate art trade to flourish).
16 See, e.g., Comment, The Evolution of American Attitudes, supra note 6, at
623-24 (generally recognized character of the "illicit flow of objects from art-rich, eco-
nomically poor third-world countries to wealthy art-importing nations").
17 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1982). United States Customs regulations providing
the mechanism through which to enforce the Act were at last promulgated on March
31, 1986 (19 C.F.R. §§ 12.102-12.104). The ratification of the Convention on Cultural
Property Implementation Act made the United States an active party to the UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in
10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. As discussed below, the
CPIA contains a number of modifications of the original terms of the Convention, lim-
iting its broad sweep with respect to the enforcement of claims for the return of cultural
property to foreign governments. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 872, 876-77;
Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1891-92 n.30
(1985); Comment, The Evolution of American Attitudes, supra note 6, at 630-31. See
also Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at 64-65 (provi-
sions of the original draft of the UNESCO Convention itself were "amended and
watered down" to gain wider acceptance by parties, with United States registering for-
mal reservations to final terms proscribing acquisition of illegally exported material by
institutions).
16 See supra note 17.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
art trade,'19 to foster international cultural exchange, and to help, with
the participation of other nations, stem illegal traffic in art and antiqui-
ties."0 Some inconsistency remains in the United States' treatment of
claims regarding cultural property residing in or entering the country
as a result of international trade, whether lawful or illicit. 21 But the
CPIA provides for the first time clear guidelines for United States
courts presented with claims for the recovery of cultural property ex-
ported from other nations, particularly in situations where the validity
of those claims turns on provisions of another country's domestic law.
The uncertainty engendered by the controversial McClain deci-
19 But see Comment, The Evolution of American Attitudes, supra note 6, at 633-
35 (joining the UNESCO Convention and passing the CPIA may in fact have put the
United States in a vulnerable position with respect to other major art importing coun-
tries which adopt laissez-faire attitudes toward illicit traffic in cultural property and
which refuse to sign onto the Convention). See also McAlee, supra note 1, at 604
(discussing concerns, expressed prior to passage of the CPIA, that United States adop-
tion of the UNESCO Convention would do little to curb the black market in cultural
property but instead would divert trade to other art importing nations). These fears
were recently given credence in the remark of Andr6 Emmerich, a prominent New
York dealer who formerly traded in pre-Columbian antiquities, concerning the effect of
recent United States policy: "It all goes to Geneva now. Don't kid yourself. The market
continues, but not here." Grimes, The Antiquities Boom: Who Pays the Price?, N.Y.
Times Magazine, July 16, 1989, at 24; cf also Honan, Second Missing Manuscript
Turns Up in German Hands, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (noting leni-
ency of Swiss law regarding traffic in art of questionable provenance).
20 Professor Fitzpatrick has written:
As the comprehensive statement of U.S. policy on the importation of cul-
tural properties, the Cultural Property Law [CPIA] reflects the painstak-
ing efforts of Congress to balance the legitimate but sharply competing
goals of archaeologists and anthropologists, art dealers and collectors, mu-
seum directors, the academic community, and the bureaucrats from the
State and Justice Departments, the United States Information Agency and
the Customs Service.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 859; cf. L. PaoTr & P.J. O'KzEEr, LAW AND THE CUL-
TURAL HERITAGE, VOL. I: DIscovERY AND EXCAVATION 15-27 (1984) (catalogue of
competing interests to be considered in legislative action regarding cultural property).
21 Variations exist among standards expressed in state and local laws regulating
the art market, for example, state "art laws" extant in some jurisdictions, such as New
York and California (e.g., statutes cited in Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at
63 n.58); local regulations such as New York's Arts and Cultural Affairs and Con-
sumer Protection Laws (see generally Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact,
supra note 14, at 74-80; Putting Price Tags in Art Galleries, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1988, § 1, at 58, col. 3); state common law (see, e.g., Comment, The Recovery of Stolen
Art, supra note 4, at 1147-48 (contrasting certain New York and New Jersey decisions
in cases dealing with stolen art)); and interpretations of Uniform Commercial Code
provisions (see, e.g., Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4 (discussing
New York decision imposing hitherto unique prerequisites for art merchants to achieve
status of good faith purchasers under the Code)). In addition, administrative actions by
the United States Customs Service do not currently square with federal law governing
the implementation of international treaties concerning the movement of cultural prop-
erty. See infra note 181.
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sions"2 has been resolved by well-reasoned statutory requirements 3
that permit the judicial and executive branches of the United States
government to implement the policies underlying the CPIA without
usurping the United States' right as a sovereign nation to control per-
sons and property within its jurisdiction.24
3.2. Common Law
At the same time, recent judicial opinions, notably DeWeerth v.
Baldinger,5 decided in 1987 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, have shown increasing concern for protecting good
faith purchasers of artworks obtained through international com-
merce.26 DeWeerth, a civil suit brought in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction, is of particular importance since it was decided under the
law of New York, the principal locus of the art trade in the United
States. The DeWeerth court struck a balance between the interests of a
22 See supra note 1.
22 See, e.g., CPIA, supra note 17, §§ 302(7)(A), 305, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602(a)(1),
2604. Adherence to the spirit of the final version of the OPIA, forged after endless
hours of Congressional debate, would in effect vitiate the need for an amendment the
NSPA or similar legislation intended to prevent its application to future cases with
facts similar to McClain. See Nafziger, Repose Legislation: A Threat to the Protection
of the World's Cultural Heritage, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 250 (1987) (criticizing pro-
posed federal Cultural Property Repose Act, since defeated, as contrary to balance of
national and global interests struck by the CPIA) (see H.R. 2389, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), and S. 1523, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). But see A Bill to Amend Sections
2314 and 2315 of Title 18, United States Code, Relating to Stolen Archaeological
Material; to the Committee on the Judiciary, S. 605, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. S2611-12 (daily ed. March 6, 1985).
24 This right is well established by internationally recognized conflict of law prin-
ciples. See, e.g., Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at 68
(citing Bassiouni, Reflections on Criminal Jurisdiction in the International Protection
of Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 281, 305-06 (1983)) (brief
discussion of territoriality theory of jurisdiction, under which "a state formulates and
enforces law within its own territory, and will not enforce a foreign or penal law").
The choice of United States jurisdictional principles, rather than foreign statutory dec-
larations, as guideposts for judicial decisions, allows the United States to enforce a
selective import policy with respect to art and antiquities, rather than granting a
"blank check" to foreign governments in enforcing their domestic laws and regulations
in United States courts. See generally Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 71-
79 (discussion of "blank check" and "selective" approaches to import control); see also
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 871 ("Significantly, the Senate committee report on the
Cultural Property Law [CPIA] states that U.S. policy will not turn on foreign declara-
tions of ownership, but on U.S. determinations.").
2- 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
26 Compare DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103, with Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300,
267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affd and modified per curiam, 28 A.D.2d
516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967). See also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678
F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
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foreign claimant seeking the return of cultural property27 and the inter-
ests of the successful defendants, a bona fide purchaser and the reputa-
ble art gallery from which she purchased the disputed piece.28 The
DeWeerth decision brings case law in this area into conformity with the
implicit goal of the CPIA's modifications of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention29 by promoting stability in art trade transactions occurring
within the United States."0 Maintaining such commercial stability will
allow the United States to remain a viable participant in the interna-
tional art market.
4. BACKGROUND
4.1. The Nature of the Art Market
This Comment deals with international commerce in works of art.
This concept requires some elaboration, because both "international
commerce" and "works of art" are terms seemingly open to limitless
different constructions. Generally, the Comment assumes that interna-
tional trade in art consists of transactions, both legitimate and illegiti-
mate (notions which are, as discussed below, themselves subject to di-
verse interpretations), whose ultimate object is the sale of a given piece
to a private or institutional consumer.
4.1.1. The Notion of "Cultural Property"
The Comment is concerned mainly with the market in fine art,
i.e., paintings, sculpture, and graphic works. Other types of imported
cultural property, including historic artifacts such as relics, documents,
and decorative or utilitarian objects, are likely to be controlled by iden-
tical rules and principles, although laws and treaties that contemplate
the disposition of narrowly defined types of cultural materials also ex-
27 The case involved a claim by DeWeerth, a West German national, that an
Impressionist painting belonging to her had been stolen from safekeeping in Germany
during World War II and subsequently resold to the defendant Baldinger, a good faith
purchaser. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104-05. Baldinger, an American citizen, impleaded
Wildenstein & Co., a New York art gallery from which she had purchased the work in
1957. Id. at 104-05. See infra notes 76-154 and accompanying text.
a8 See supra note 11.
11 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
30 Compare U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (underlying policy of the Uniform Code, now
adopted in most states of the United States, to promote commerce by furnishing clear,
uniform rules governing transactions); see also Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market,
supra note 4, at 457 (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 144 (1980) ("One of the principal goals of
the laws governing the sale of goods is facilitating free transfer of title.").
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ist.3 ' Therefore, the Comment employs "cultural property," "art," and
like terms in a general sense and as virtually interchangeable,3 2 except
where the text specifies a particular category of art or artifact. 3
4.1.2. General Description of Art Market Transactions
Typically, a chain of art market transactions begins with the re-
moval or export, subsequent to discovery 4 or purchase, of artwork
from a country other than the United States. 35 The artwork is then
imported - or smuggled - into the United States, where it may be
retained by the importer, sold - privately, through a dealer, or at auc-
tion - or otherwise transferred to another party or series of parties. In
this way the work may enter the possession of a merchant, a private
3 E.g., Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Property, July 17, 1970, United States-Mex-
ico, art. I, 1(a), 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 (bilateral agreement specifically
concerning pre-Columbian art and artifacts); Regulation of Importation of Pre-Colum-
bian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095
(1976). Although even the broadest legislation usually includes some definitions or
statement of scope, see, e.g., UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. I (definition of
"cultural property"), the cited examples illustrate United States governmental re-
sponses to very specific problems of archaeological pillage. See P. BATOR, supra note 1,
at 6-7. See also generally Kimmelman, Indian Art vs. Artifact: Problem of Ambiguity,
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1989, at Cll, col. 1 (discussing problem of defining Canadian or
American Indian materials in museums as "art, artifacts, or something else
altogether").
32 In one recent article, Professor Merryman has observed: "The entire question
of the proper definition of cultural property for legal and policy purposes is a large and
unruly one .... Works of art and archaeological and ethnological objects surely qualify
under any definition . . . ." Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 2, at 831
n.1; cf UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. I.
'3 For example, Mayan stelae. UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. I.
14 "Discovery" may also encompass the unauthorized looting of monuments and
archaeological sites. See generally K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST (1973); see also
L. PRoTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, supra note 20, at 4 (scope of terms used in title).
11 While this Comment concentrates on disputes surrounding artworks which
have at some point been imported into the United States, one must observe that the
United States, too, is a fertile source of desirable - and marketable - cultural prop-
ert, from Native American archaeological treasures to contemporary works by living
artists. These resources must also be considered by legislators and judges in formulating
national policy to govern the treatment of American art and antiquities. See generally
Comment, The Evolution of American Attitudes, supra note 6 (thorough consideration
of legislation to preserve domestic cultural property, particularly Native American
materials); Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 66 n.68 (citing discussion of
United States export controls in Prott, supra note 15, at 333); cf. Visual Artists' Rights
Act, S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 133 CONG. REc. § 11,502 (daily ed. Aug.
6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy: "In our country, as in every other country and
civilization, artists are the recorders,[sic] and preservers of the national spirit. The crea-
tive arts are an expression of the character of the Nation - they mirror its accomplish-
ments, warn of its failings, and anticipate its future."); see also L. PROTT & P.J.
O'KEEFE, supra note 20, at 64-65 (summary of current United States laws intended to
preserve indigenous material culture).
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collector, or an institution such as a museum or a university.
4.2.' Art Market Disputes
4.2.1. The Context in Which Claims Arise
Controversy over rightful title to the artwork may arise at any
point in the transactional chain. Claims to possession of a given object
may be asserted by private parties or by foreign governments and may
be dealt with through private, diplomatic, administrative, or legal chan-
nels. Such claims may be litigated in criminal or civil actions, depend-
ing on the factual context of each case. The present discussion will fo-
cus on controversies concerning artworks already at the point of entry
into the United States or reposing in United States collections, includ-
ing works intended for sale in exchanges governed by United States
federal, state, or local laws.
4.2.2. The Concept of National Patrimony
a. Definitional Problems
Behind the difficulty in resolving artwork title disputes lies the
elusive definition of "national patrimony." Whether an object is consid-
ered by a given nation to be an important part of its cultural heritage,
and therefore worthy of legal actions to keep the object in that nation,
may be crucial to the United States' designating the object as stolen or
wrongfully exported. The status of the work in its country of export
may thus be decisive in the United States determination of whether the
importer should be penalized or made to disgorge the object.
What constitutes a country's national patrimony is thus a subjec-
tive inquiry. It begins in the United States with an examination of the
art object's provenance and the claims of the nation or nations where
the object originated or has resided for some period of time deemed
sufficient to create a valid interest in the object. Historically, art-pro-
ducing and art-amassing nations have given attention to maintaining or
recovering the artistic products of their own cultures as well as the im-
ported aesthetic treasures residing in domestic collections, primarily
during wartime.86 Public and private attempts to retrieve art lost dur-
" Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19
INT'L LAW. 835, 838-40 (1985) [hereinafter Nafziger, International Penal Aspects];
Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework for the Return, Restitution or
Forfeiture of Cultural Property, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 790, 791 (1983) [here-
inafter Nafziger, The New International Legal Framework]; Note, The Illicit Move-
ment of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at 61; Comment, The Evolution of American
Attitudes, supra note 6, at 625-26; Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 54-57;
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ing wartime continue today as works seized or purloined during World
War II surface in the United States. 37 However, art-rich countries have
recently perceived a general and urgent need for protective legislation to
maintain art objects as a cultural legacy. This concern springs partly
from a nascent sense of autonomy and ethnic self-determination among
nations which have sought or achieved independence since World War
11,38 partly in response to publicity in the past two decades about the
ongoing, but previously unrecognized or ignored, pillage of archaeologi-
cal treasures,39 and partly from a general heightened sensitivity to the
value and ephemeral nature of cultural property.40
In addition, as one observer has noted, "[tihe political pressure ex-
erted on the State Department by these art-rich nations to address this
problem [destruction of national patrimony] has coincided with an in-
creasing U.S. need for Latin American political and economic coopera-
tion." '41 The United States' use of "cultural property as a bargaining
chip" in the battle against international drug traffic42 has no doubt en-
hanced the tendency of art exporting states to view cultural property as
a valuable national resource.
As a number of current sources reveal, "[tihe traffic in stolen or
smuggled art, now estimated at more than $1 billion a year, has re-
Comment, International Law in Domestic Forums: The State of the Art, 9 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 179, 179-80 nn.2-4 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, International Law in
Domestic Forums].
37 See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir. 1982); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966),
affd and modified per curiam, 28 A.D. 2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967). For a very
recent example, see Honan, Second Manuscript Turns Up in German Hands, N.Y.
Times, June 16, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Glueck, Significance of the Works That Vanished
from Mine, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1990, at C22, coT. 5; Honan, A Trove of Medieval
Art Turns Up in Texas, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1990, Al, col. 3; see also infra note 165
(discussing outcome of the resulting dispute over German objects rediscovered in
Texas).
38 Stille, Was This Statue Stolen? U.S. Courts Help Protect Art Heritage, Nat'l
L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 32, col. 1.
" See P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 1-6; K. MEYER, supra note 34; Note, Emerg-
ing United States Policy with Regard to the International Movement of National Cul-
tural Property, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 166, 166 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Emerging
United States Policy].
40 See UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, preamble. See generally L. PROTT
and P.J. O'KEEFE, supra note 34, at 7-12; Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and
Artifact, supra note 14, at 58.
41 Note, Emerging United States Policy, supra note 39, at 166.
42 Stille, supra note 38, at 32. Stille suggests, to cite one example, that bilateral
agreements between the United States and Mexico, and between the United States and
Peru, to curtail commerce in illicitly obtained pre-Columbian art were executed in ex-
change for affirmative measures on the parts of those nations to curb the production of
illegal drugs that make their way illicitly across the United States border. Cf. infra
note 43 and accompanying text.
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cently become second only to drugs in the world's black-market econ-
omy."4 Supplementing this development has been the growing interest,
described above,"" of art-rich lands in preserving an intact material rec-
ord of their ethnic heritages. In many cases, this interest leads to the
passage of export restrictions, title-vesting statutes, and preservation
laws that define as contraband much of the cultural property formerly
considered fair game for art traders.45 Hence, the exponential increase
in illegal trafficking in cultural property reflects not just a surge in
activity among art thieves and smugglers, but an expanded concept of
"illicit trade."
b. Legal Problems
In any event, the divergence among national policies on what
should be considered "patrimony" represents'an enormous, and possi-
bly insuperable, hurdle in the consistent interpretation and administra-
tion of cultural property law. This hurdle exists even where the provi-
sions of an applicable document, such as the UNESCO Convention,
46
attempt to clarify that ultimately subjective notion.
Still less definitive guidance has existed for courts faced with
3 Stille, supra note 38, at 32; cf. Nafziger, The New International Legal Frame-
work, supra note 36 (citing Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 22, 1982 (Midwestern &
Western Editions), at 19, col. 2). Lyndel Prott has observed:
[T]he publicity surrounding the volume of the art trade, its soaring prices,
the aggressive promotion by auction houses and the continual emphasis on
the record-breaking sums reached, have done much to promote cultural
property as a lucrative field for dishonest activities, and to attract illicitly
acquired goods to the auction and sales rooms of the 'art market' states.
Prott, supra note 15, at 345, quoted in Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact,
supra note 14, at 55.
" Supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
See generally L. PRoTT and P.J. O'KEEFE, supra note 20, ch. 2; S. WILLIAMS,
supra note 15; INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, THE PROTECTION OF CUL-
TURAL PROPERTY: HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS (B. Burnham ed. 1974).
4' UNESCO Convention, supra note 17, art. 4, offers an enumeration of rather
vague categories of property forming "part of the cultural heritage of each State." In-
cluded are indigenous works "of importance to the State concerned," id., art. 4(a), and
"cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with the consent of the com-
petent authorities of the country of origin of such property." Id., art. 4(e). Clearly,
such terms offer little help to authorities dealing with claims to cultural property by a
foreign state since the provisions leave the determination of what is "of importance" to
the claimant. The question of which party has superior rights to a given object remains
to be thrashed out by the disputants. Similarly, while the CPIA, supra note 17, refers
specifically to "cultural patrimony," e.g., id., § 303, neither the UNESCO Convention
nor the CPIA defines the term. Rather, requests by state parties for import restrictions
on objects forming part of the allegedly endangered cultural patrimony are evaluated by
a Cultural Property Advisory Committee on an ad hoc basis, assuming that the prop-
erty at issue falls within certain general qualifications set forth in CPIA § 302, 19
U.S.C. § 2601. See id., § 306, 19 U.S.C. § 2605. But see infra note 71.
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claims against United States holders of exported cultural property by
nations not party to agreements like the UNESCO Convention. For
example, Italy has been particularly vigorous in asserting claims arising
from the export of artworks the government deems part of the Italian
cultural patrimony.4 7 Like other European countries with a significant
stake in the international art trade, Italy has not adopted the UNESCO
Convention,48 but chooses to take unilateral action based on Italian do-
mestic law regarding the export of works of art. The threat to a healthy
United States art trade created by such a nation's claims is vividly illus-
trated in the celebrated case of Jeanneret v. Vichey.
49
5. THE EXAMPLE OF JEANNERET V. VICHEY
5.1. Facts of the Case
In 1970, the plaintiff Jeanneret, an art dealer and Swiss national,
purchased a painting by Matisse in New York City.50 When she
47 P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 17 ("[T]here are persistent complaints, primarily in
Italy and England, that the national patrimony is being depleted by the export of art
treasures."). Concerning one possible interpretation of "patrimony," i.e., as national
capital, Professor Bator also observes that England considers "imported" treasures -
notably the Elgin marbles - as part of its own national patrimony. Id. at 27; cf
Merryman, supra note 17. For a description of the selective export controls imple-
mented by England, see P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 43-45; see also Kimmelman, The
Case of the Vanishing Art, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, § 2-1, at col. 2 (lamenting loss
to foreign buyers of the United States' cultural heritage, defined to include foreign-
produced works of art residing in United States public collections).
48 Italy, a principal source of cultural riches, participates in the global art market
largely as a supplier, although a brisk trade in art and antiquities is carried on within
its own borders (the world's second largest auctioneer, Christie's Ltd., for instance,
maintains auction rooms in Rome). The major centers of international commerce in
works of art, however, remain France, Switzerland, Great Britain, West Germany, the
United States, and, increasingly, Japan. Of these nations, only the United States has
been willing to participate in multilateral cooperative efforts to limit the international
black market in cultural property. See generally Grimes, supra note 19, at 24; Com-
ment, The Evolution of American Attitudes, supra note 6, at 633-35 (citing Cultural
Property Treaty Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3403 Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1979)) (impedi-
ments to effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention due to refusal of other art import-
ing nations to sign).
" 541 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1982). The complexity of the relevant facts inJeanneret are typical of those surround-
ing artworld transactions. Here, a painting by a French artist passed through several
countries - France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States - as it changed hands.
Over the years the work had been transferred both by inheritance and by private sale
and had also entered the public market. See generally Comment, Jeanneret v. Vichey:
Evaporating the Cloud, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999, 1002-04 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Evaporating the Cloud]; Note, Jeanneret v. Vichey: Sales of Illegally
Exported Art under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 275,
282-84 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art].
10 Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 282-83. The painting,
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learned during a 1974 visit to Italy5" that the painting, Portrait sur
fond jaune,5 2 had probably been exported from Italy in contravention
of Italian export laws, she attempted unsuccessfully to rescind the sale.
She then sued the seller, Madame Vichey, for breach of warranty of
title. Jeanneret claimed that she could neither "sell the painting nor
'show it" in the legitimate art market.5" Following the commencement
of her action in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the Italian government brought criminal charges
against Vichey and her husband for illegally exporting the portrait.54
5.2. The Jeanneret Decision
In attempting to resolve the breach of warranty claim, the United
States courts focused on the matter of title without exploring other is-
sues of important practical consequence to Jeanneret as a dealer and,
indeed, to the United States art market in general. As one commentator
has observed:
The broader underlying issue [raised by Jeanneret] is
whether any exporting nation, by threatening actual or po-
tential owners with fines or confiscation, can cloud the title
to or impair the marketability of a work exported without
the approval of the exporting nation. Neither the trial nor
the appellate courts satisfactorily analyzed or answered these
Portrait sur fond jaune, had been imported into Italy in 1951 by the father of the
seller-defendant, Madame Vichey, who in turn exported the work and brought it to
New York soon after inheriting it in 1970. Id. at 282. Under circumstances unclear
from the record, the painting was transported initially from Italy to Switzerland, then
the Vicheys imported it into the United States. Id. at 283.
"I SeeJeanneret, 693 F.2d 259, Joint Appendix at 91a, cited in Comment, Evap-
orating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1003 n.36,
2 The French title of the picture translates to "Portrait on Yellow Background."
53 Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 261. Although before bringing suit Jeanneret had re-
jected as insufficient several offers from persons interested in buying the Matisse, id. at
260, at trial she introduced compelling testimonial evidence from revered dealers and
auctioneers to demonstrate the virtual impossibility of selling the disputed Matisse to a
reputable art merchant. Id. at 263.
5" Jeanneret, 541 F. Supp. at 83 n.5. The charges stemmed from the Vicheys'
having brought the painting out of Italy without seeking formal permission from that
country's government; in 1979 the Italian Minister of Culture added Portrait surfond
jaune to its list of artworks of particular importance to Italy's national patrimony (the
reasoning behind this characterization is unclear; see Comment, Evaporating the
Cloud, supra note 49, at 1003 n.31, 1005 n.47; Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art,
supra note 49, at 286 n.82), rendering the exporters liable under Italy's jurisdiction to
the government. See Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1007-12
(discussion of Italian cultural property laws); Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art,
supra note 49, at 284-85 nn.74-79.
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questions.55
The district court in Jeanneret did not think it necessary to reach
the question of validity as to the Italian claim, 6 holding that the mere
assertion of such a claim breached the seller's implied warranty of title
under UCC § 2-312.57 However, the court of appeals conditioned a
final determination of whether the Italian claim 58 "clouded" Jean-
neret's title on her ability to establish that the export had indeed vio-
lated the letter of the applicable Italian law. 59 This factual question in
turn depended upon the painting's age, the issue to be tried on
remand. o
5.3. Implications of Jeanneret
Looking beyond the narrow holding in Jeanneret, both the appel-
'5 Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 278; accord Comment,
Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 999 ("[Tjhe Court of Appeals effectively
sidestepped the central legal issue the case has raised. That issue is whether any viola-
tion of Italian export laws should constitute a 'substantial cloud on title' of the painting
and be a breach of implied warranty of title." (footnote omitted)). The latter observer
argues cogently that for reasons of policy and law, in a case like Jeanneret, breach of
warranty of title under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312 as adopted in New York
should not lie; by effectively granting a "blank check" to art exporting countries, such a
holding would "set a dangerous and problematic precedent." Id. at 1019.
5 Even under Italian law the Italian government's claim, if any, would be en-
forceable only against the exporters themselves (here, the Vicheys), not against subse-
quent good-faith purchasers. Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at
1010, 1016. Moreover, Italy would probably recognize that Jeanneret had acquired
good title to the Matisse regardless of the Vicheys' unlawful export, and in any event
the painting would probably not be subject to confiscation. Id. at 1009-12.
51 Jeanneret, 541 F. Supp. at 83. Significantly, however, the Italian government
did not claim ownership of the Matisse, or that Madame Vichey's title to it was sus-
pect, only that the Vicheys should be penalized for illegally removing it from the coun-
try. See Jeanneret, 678 F.2d at 266; see also Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra
note 49, at 1010.
58 See supra note 54.
" The litigants introduced some question as to which of two Italian laws were
applicable to the Matisse as cultural property.
Under a 1913 law, the painting, if at least fifty years old, would have been lawfully
exported only if the Vicheys had paid a fee to obtain a government permit (the govern-
ment might also have had the right to purchase the work rather than allowing its
removal). See Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 262; Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra
note 49, at 289-90; Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1007-08. If a
1939 law controlled, the Vicheys could be subject to the Italian government's claims,
but only if the painting were, again, fifty years old at the time of export. SeeJeanneret,
541 F. Supp. at 83; Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1008-11.
Hence, the court of appeals remanded the case for determination of the factual issue of
the painting's age, since the exact year Matisse executed Portrait sur fond jaune re-
mained in dispute. Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 269.
'0 Jeanneret, 693 F.2d 259. No further litigation is reported in the Jeanneret
case. Apparently the parties settled privately after the court of appeals' decision.
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late court opinion 6' and subsequent analyses of the case62 reveal a gen-
eral consensus that a mere export violation should not constitute a
breach of warranty of title in the sale of art." Moreover, the court of
appeals, expressing skepticism as to the Italian government's right to
claim a twentieth-century French painting as part of its national patri-
mony, 4 demonstrated sensitivity to the vulnerability of the art
merchant - as well as the purchaser - in the face of even tenuous
claims to artworks by foreign governments."5 Indeed, Jeanneret might
have succeeded in obtaining a judgment had she sued the Vicheys for
breach of warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial
Code.66
61 Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 266.
62 E.g. Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 279; Comment,
Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1019.
11 See Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 443 n.4 (whether
transfer of artwork exported in violation of foreign law constitutes breach of implied
warranty of title under U.C.C. § 2-312 remains an open question; effect on such claims
of United States' adoption of UNESCO Convention still remains to be tested).
14 The court questioned whether Portrait sur fond jaune, a "painting by a pro-
lific French post-impressionist master ... not claimed to be an outstanding master-
piece," constituted the "tremendous loss to the national heritage" claimed by the Italian
government. Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 263-64 n.6. Furthermore, a recent commentator
observed that the Matisse apparently escaped official notice as being a national treasure
when the Italian government conducted a thorough inventory of the collection of Mad-
ame Vichey's father in 1969. Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at
1005 n.47; cf. P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 17 ("In my opinion the illegal export as such
of [modern-era European paintings and sculpture] does not, in itself, constitute a seri-
ous problem, even though there are persistent complaints [from Italy]"; however, Italy
is justified in complaining of the export of antiquities and archaeological materials).
6" Although uncertain that Jeanneret's legal claim for breach of warranty of title
would ultimately succeed, the court of appeals sympathized with her predicament in
owning a painting she could not, according to the expert testimony at trial and briefs
from several amid curiae, sell through legitimate art market channels because of ques-
tions surrounding the work's provenance. See Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art,
supra note 49, at 296-97 (citing Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 268). Her injury represented a
thwarting of the basic policy of promoting commerce which underlies the U.C.C. Note,
Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 297 n.163.
66 U.C.C. § 2-314. For a thorough examination of Jeanneret's possible avenues in
seeking redress under the U.C.C. for her injuries through having received an unmar-
ketable painting, see Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49; cf. Note,
Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 445 (implicit duties in some jurisdic-
tions require that art dealers investigate title to paintings before making purchase).
Apparently Jeanneret did not ask to examine the painting's export papers or other
documentation of provenance. Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at
1012. Once the Italian government's claim was made known, however, neither she nor
other professionals in the trade wished to handle the Matisse. See supra note 53; see
also Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 61 n.56 (discussing application of the
U.C.C.'s warranty provisions to art market transactions).
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6. STATE OF THE LAW AFTER JEANNERET
The Jeanneret court's de facto endorsement of the common law
principle that transgressions of foreign export regulations do not affect
the title of a good-faith purchaser in the United States,67 and its consid-
eration of the related merchantability problem, are consistent with the
policy embodied in the CPIA.68 The OPIA attempts to limit the class of
property subject to foreign claims and thereby ensure fair notice to im-
porters of what materials they may deal in without danger of legal lia-
bility.69 Indeed, because the stability of the United States art market as
6 p. BATOR, supra note 1, at 11; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 106-08. Profes-
sor Bator sets forth in his study the oft-invoked statement of "the fundamental general
rule" (thrown into some question by the McClain cases, supra note 1):
The fact that an art object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar
it from lawful importation into the United States, and illegal export does
not itself render the importer (or one who took from him) in any way
actionable in a U.S. court; the possession of an art object cannot be law-
fully disturbed in the United States solely because it was illegally exported
from another country.
P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 11. On the effect of foreign export restrictions on the
ownership of cultural property, the court in United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988,
1002-03 (5th Cir. 1977), noted:
[E]xcept for [their] effect on jurisdiction, restrictions on exportation are
just like any other police power restrictions. They do not create "owner-
ship" in the state. The state comes to own property only when it acquires
such property in the general manner by which private persons come to
own property, or when it declares itself the owner; the declaration is an
attribute of sovereignty.
Id.; see also Merryman, The Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against Pil-
laging and Theft, in DuBOFF, ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 245
(1975) at 239-41, 244, cited in McClain, 545 F.2d at 1003 n.32 (discussion of Italian
law).
68 Italy is not a party to the UNESCO Convention. See supra note 48 and accom-
panying text. The procedures for controlling the movement of cultural property out-
lined by the Convention and the implementing legislation therefore do not apply to
claims and requests by the Italian government. Nevertheless, the judicial-and adminis-
trative treatment (and perhaps also the informal resolution) of title disputes involving
artworks exported from Italy and countries like it will be informed by the substantive
provisions of statutes and treaties adopted by the United States. See generally
UNESCO Convention, supra note 17.
69 Section 305 of the CPIA, for example, provides that, in order to obtain a
United States import embargo on "archaeological and ethnological" materials (see
CPIA, supra note 17, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 for a narrow definition of these terms),
such materials must be placed on a list to be promulgated by the Secretary of the
Treasury. The Act states in part:
The Secretary may list such material by type or other appropriate classifi-
cation, but each listing made under this section shall be sufficiently spe-
cific and precise to insure that (1) the import restrictions under section
307 are applied only to the archaeological and ethnological material cov-
ered by the agreement or emergency action; and (2) fair notice is given to
importers and other persons as to what material is subject to such
restrictions.
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a whole depends not only on the buyer's ability to secure quiet title to a
work, but also on his confidence in entering a transaction for
purchase,70 protecting actual merchantability (rather than legally en-
forceable rights alone) must be a central policy goal in establishing cul-
tural property. The mere possibility suggested by the Jeanneret case
that a United States court would enforce any Italian claims - whether
directed against the importer alone or against subsequent purchasers of
a work of art - would certainly impede both the flow of art into the
United States and the legitimate sale (or exhibition)7' of imported
works. Art dealers and lay persons alike may be disinclined to engage
in imports and purchase transactions72 within the United States' juris-
diction absent the positive assurance of legal authority protecting them
against such claims.
CPIA, supra note 17, § 305, 19 U.S.C. 2604 (emphasis added). Even in the case of
stolen cultural property, under § 308 the material must be documented as taken after
the effective date of the CPIA (or the effective adoption of the convention by the com-
plaining state, whichever is later) - a provision that would have obviated the questions
inJeanneret as to the applicable Italian law and the painting's age - from a "museum
or . . . monument or similar institution." CPIA, supra note 17, § 308, 19 U.S.C. §
2607.
"0 See supra note 66.
" See CPIA, supra note 17, § 312, 19 U.S.C. § 2611 (exemption of materials
within the Act which are on temporary display and of works reposing in museums and
like institutions, under specified conditions); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (1965) (act to
render immune from seizure under judicial process certain objects of cultural signifi-
cance imported into the United States for temporary display or exhibition, and for
other purposes).
72 Such transactions would include negotiations and other activities directed to-
ward the sale of art, if not the actual contract formation or transfer of property. The
court in Jeanneret applied New York law, rather than Swiss or Italian law, because
the negotiations between Jeanneret and the Vicheys to sell the Matisse had taken place
in New York. The actual payment and delivery of the painting occurred in Switzer-
land. SeeJeanneret, 693 F.2d at 266. Thus every phase of the art business in America
can be affected - and depressed - by unfavorable foreign law regarding cultural
property. See Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 281 nn.45-46
(citing Brief of Amici Curiae, Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 259) (commercial worthlessness
of artworks subject to third-party claims based on foreign law).
For a full treatment of the conflict of laws questions raised by Jeanneret (and an
argument that the court erred in failing to look to the law of Switzerland, the lex situs
of the transfer), see Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 299-307;
cf Comment, International Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36 (examination of
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), advocating a
monistic approach to application of laws in international disputes and calling for the
development of an international law applicable to such questions); see also Winkworth
v. Christie Manson & Woods Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 496, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 937, [1980] 1
All E.R. 1121 (1979) (application of lex situs in case of disputed title to art which was
stolen, exported, and then sold in another country).
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7. THE CASE OF DEWEERTH V. BALDINGER
Until the DeWeerth case 3 was adjudicated in 1987, Jeanneret re-
mained the valid, if somewhat uncertain, statement of the common law
governing private parties' 4 disputes over the legal status of artwork
transferred via international trade (at least in New York, unquestion-
ably the art market capital of the United States). Jeanneret highlights a
number of the major themes in formulating law concerning the interna-
tional movement of cultural property:76 the riddle of what constitutes
national patrimony;76 the difficulties in choice of law and in interpreta-
11 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988).
7" Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), an
important and complex case brought in the Eastern District of New York (536 F.
Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)) and decided on appeal by the Second Circuit the same
year as Jeanneret, involved a claim by a German Democratic Republic state museum
that a pair of Duerer portrait paintings, property of the German government, had been
stolen during World War II. The museum sought to recover the paintings from
Elicofon, an American lawyer who claimed he had purchased them from an ex-United
States serviceman. Kohn, $6 Million Art Held Property of East Germany, N.Y.L.J.,
May 6, 1982, at 1. Elicofon thus involved a direct action by a foreign government
against a United States citizen, unlike Jeanneret, where the Italian government was a
third party claimant who did not enter the case, and DeWeerth, where all the litigants
were private parties (although the plaintiff was a West German national, the German
government laid no claim to the disputed artwork).
Nonetheless, Elicofon implicates many of the crucial problems raised by Jean-
neret, including the role of purchaser and seller in investigating and documenting prov-
enance and vexed conflict of laws questions. See generally Comment, International
Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36. Moreover, unlike Jeanneret, both Elicofon
and DeWeerth were actions to recover artworks allegedly stolen during the Second
World War. DeWeerth, as discussed below, altered the previous tendency of New York
law to favor plaintiffs in such disputes, destroying the finality of commercial transac-
tions involving cultural property and undercutting the foundation of the New York art
trade. Compare DelVeerth, 836 F.2d 103, with Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, and Menzel v.
List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affd and modified per
curiam, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967). See generally Note, Title Disputes
in the Art Market, supra note 4.
Since the writing of this Comment, the New York Court of Appeals has elabo-
ratpd further on the issues raised in DeWeerth; see infra note 125.
" "The issues raised by Jeanneret are simply an extension of the issues raised
during the debates over McClain and the UNESCO Convention." Note, Sales of Ille-
gally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 317; cf. McAlee, From the Boston Raphael,
supra note 1, at 591-94 (possibility of art-related civil suits brought under the McClain
doctrine); P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 75-78 (possible consequences of McClain on civil
litigation arising from international art transactions).
78 The terms and legislative history of the CPIA, supra note 46, do not offer a
definitive statement of what should be considered "national patrimony" but give some
insight into the problem unavailable during the pendency of Jeanneret. Congress
wished the CPIA to encompass works with "characteristics which distinguish them
from other objects in the same category providing particular insights into the origins
and history of a people." S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 25 (1982), quoted
in Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 872 n.51.
Nafziger has suggested a "triage" approach to determining how great a part of the
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tion of foreign laws;7 the importance of documenting provenance; the
responsibilities of owners, dealers, and purchasers in investigating title
to the artwork;78 and the attendant evidentiary problems.79 DeWeerth
claimant nation's patrimony is represented by a particular object, and how to treat that
object accordingly. See Nafziger, An Anthro-Apology for Managing the International
Flow of Cultural Property, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189, 196-98 (1982) (summarized in
Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 73-74 n.121).
7' In addition to having to decide which country's law to apply to a dispute - or
to aspects of it, see Comment, International Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36,
at 191-97 (separate judicial consideration of the national interests implicated by each
issue in Elicofon before choosing and applying law) - the court in cases likeJeanneret
and Elicofon may find confusion, even among the foreign jurisdiction's own experts, as
to the correct interpretation of applicable statutes. The dispute in Jeanneret over
whether the 1913 statute was superseded by a 1939 law enacted during Mussolini's
regime illustrates this potential difficulty, not unlikely in the many nations whose gov-
ernments have been unstable during the past century. Cf Comment, International
Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36 (complex litigation surrounding the Elicofon
case reflects numerous changes in defining German territorial and political boundaries,
leading to conflict as to applicable law and even question of standing to sue for recovery
of national treasure); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d at 997-1000, United States v.
McClain, 593 F.2d at 666-71 (question as to whether controlling Mexican law, to be
applied by United States court, was embodied in statute of 1897, of 1934, or of 1972,
and further conflict even among Mexican authorities as to the correct interpretation of
applicable law); Socialist Republic of Rumania v. Wildenstein & Co., 85 Civ. 2435
(DNE) (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Socialist Republic of Rumania v. Kimbell Art Foundation,
No. CA4 84 176K (N.D. Tex. 1984) (suit by the former government of Rumania
based on sale of El Greco painting by Rumania's then-King, claiming transfer void
because title to property rightfully vested in the people of Rumania),,cited in Malaro,
The Museum's Perspective, in ART LAW 847, 854-55 (PLI 1988).
On the difficulty of enforcing penal sanctions prescribed under international cul-
tural property agreements, see generally Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Arti-
fact, supra note 14, at 68-69; Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 36;
see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 873-74 (problems of legal interpretation faced by
United States Customs in attempts to enforce foreign claims on cultural property).
78 See generally Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at
71-74 (failure of art dealers, auctioneers, and museums to conduct diligent provenance
investigations may require legal regulation of the art trade to discourage black market
in cultural property); Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 281-82
(failure to document provenance breaks with current usage of the art trade, rendering
art unmarketable despite "legal non-consequences" of illegal exportation; cure for un-
marketability lies in protective amendments to U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-314); Note, Title
Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 444-50 (prerequisite of investigation of
title to artworks before becoming good-faith purchaser under the U.C.C. would deter
illicit trade in art); Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1149-57
(application of so-called "discovery rule" in cases for replevin of stolen artworks would
promote salutary goal of "purchases which result from careful examination of a posses-
sor's right to sell").
" SeeJeanneret, 693 F.2d at 263 (conflicting evidence as to proper application of
Italian law); id. at 263-64, 269 (conflicting evidence as to date of painting's execution);
cf McClain, 545 F.2d at 997-1000, McClain, 593 F.2d at 666-71 (conflicting evidence,
including difficulty in translating statutes written in Spanish and credibility of expert
testimony, as to proper application of Mexican laws dating back to 1897); see also, e.g.,
McAlee, From the Boston Raphael, supra note 1, at 587-89 (general discussion of
prosecution's problems in demonstrating the National Stolen Property Act's scienter
requirement has been met; specifically, in showing defendants in McClain-type case
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also reflects upon some of these themes in the context of an action to
recover a painting stolen from Germany during World War II.
7.1. Facts of DeWeerth
The factual background of the DeWeerth case closely resembles
that of Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, in which a pair of
Duerer paintings, owned by a state museum, disappeared from the
German castle in which they were stored for safekeeping during the
post-World War II Allied occupation."0 Not until 1966 were the Duer-
ers that were discovered in the collection of a New York lawyer,"' the
defendant in the litigation to recover the paintings, considered national
treasures.8 2 In DeWeerth, the owner of a valuable painting by Monet
had sent the work in 1943 to her sister, who lived in a castle in South-
ern Germany, for safekeeping. 3 Following occupation of the castle in
1945 by American soldiers, DeWeerth's sister found that the Monet
had disappeared from the wall where she had hung it.
8 4
After learning that the painting was missing, DeWeerth made sev-
eral attempts over the next twelve years to recover it. She filed a report
of loss with the post-war military government in 1946; she inquired of
her lawyer in 1948 about the possibility of recovery; and in 1955 she
made a single communication to an art history professor asking him to
investigate the Monet's present location. Finally, in 1957 DeWeerth
included the canvas in a list submitted to the West German federal
bureau of investigation of artworks she had lost during the war. 5
However, neither DeWeerth nor those she contacted found the picture,
knew their actions violated obscure foreign title-vesting statutes); cf. U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE, SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN ARTIFACTS, POLICIES &
PROCEDURES MANUAL, Supp. No. 3280-01, Oct. 5, 1982, at 3, quoted in Nafziger,
The New International Legal Framework, supra note 36, at 794 n.26.
A more recent controversy involves a claim by the Italian government that a statue
purchased by the J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California was stolen from an
illicit archaeological excavation in Sicily. Here, too, evidentiary questions arise. Al-
though the dispute has not yet reached the courts, representatives of the Italian govern-
ment will need to prove that the statue was unearthed within its jurisdiction, and prob-
ably that, if so, the exporters (and perhaps subsequent links in the chain of
international art market transactions) were aware of the illegality of their actions. See
Stille, The Getty's Aphrodite: Fruit of an Illegal Dig?, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at
33.
80 Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 831 (E.D.N.Y.
1981). Albrecht Duerer was a renowned painter and graphic artist of sixteenth-century
Germany.
81 See supra note 74.
82 Id.
"' DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1987).
84 Id.
85 Id.
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and she took no further steps.8 6
Eventually, in 1981, a relative of DeWeerth related the tale of the
missing Monet to DeWeerth's nephew, Peter von der Heydt.17 He lo-
cated the painting, Champs de Bl a Vgtheuil,88 in the standard Cata-
logue Raisonng89 of Monet's work and discovered that DeWeerth's
canvas had been purchased from a Swiss art dealer and sold to a pri-
vate collectorby the New York art gallery Wildenstein & Co.9° When
Wildenstein refused to divulge the identity of the private collector, a
good-faith purchaser, 9 DeWeerth was obliged to secure a court order
compelling disclosure92 - a vivid illustration of the secretive nature of
even legitimate art market transactions.
7.2. The DeWeerth Litigation
Following issuance of the order in late 1982, DeWeerth contacted
the collector, Edith Marks Baldinger, and demanded the return of
Champs de Blb.93 Baldinger, an American citizen94 who had kept the
painting in her New York City apartment since 1957,11 refused in Feb-
ruary 1983 to return the Monet. 6 Uater that month, DeWeerth sued
Baldinger in the Southern District of New York, seeking recovery of
88 Id.
87 Id.
88 The painting's French title means "Wheatfield in Vetheuil."
89 The catalogue raisonn of a given artist's work generally contains information
about every known piece by that artist. The information usually includes a physical
description (and an illustration) of an object, say, a painting, as well as whatever data
the author has gleaned regarding the painting's provenance, exhibition history, and
bibliographic references. In many cases, scholars and art trade professionals universally
refer to a celebrated artist's works using the numbers assigned each work in a particu-
lar catalogue raisonn . The catalogue becomes the standard reference as to that artist.
Daniel Wildenstein's multi-volume Catalogue Raisonn of the art of Claude Monet, in
which DeWeerth's nephew looked up her painting, is such an opus. See DeWeerth, 836
F.2d at 112.
The author of the Catalogue Raisonnb, Daniel Wildenstein, is also the chief pro-
prietor of the art gallery bearing his name. Historically, this century-old concern has
frequently dealt - and continues to deal - in paintings by Monet and other Impres-
sionist masters. Therefore, the apparent coincidence of DeWeerth's picture having
passed through Wildenstein's hands is not surprising.
o DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105.
91 The parties in DeWeerth stipulated that Edith Baldinger had "purchased [the
disputed Monet] for value, in good faith, and without knowledge of any adverse claim."
Id.
92 Id. at 105-06.
93 Id. at 106.
'Id. at 104.
" Id. at 105. While she possessed the work Baldinger displayed it publicly twice,
both times in New York City, for very short durations.
96 Id. at 106.
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the painting.9 The district judge concluded that "DeWeerth had supe-
rior title and that the action was timely as she had exercised reasonable
diligence in finding the painting. ' 98 Baldinger appealed the decision to
the Second Circuit, which reversed after ruling that DeWeerth's suit
was time-barred under New York's statute of limitations.
99
7.3. Policy Import of the DeWeerth Decision
The closing sentences of the court's opinion suggest the policy im-
port of the Second Circuit's ruling:
To require a good-faith purchaser who has owned a painting
for 30 years to defend under these circumstances would be
unjust. New York law avoids this injustice by requiring a
property owner to use reasonable diligence in locating his
property. In this case, DeWeerth failed to meet that burden.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
reversed. o0
Although the appellate court's reversal rested on the specific facts of
DeWeerth,'0 ' the decision represented the latest stage in the evolution of
New York law and offers greater protection than ever before to the
finality of legitimate art purchases and to the stability of the art market
as well. Examining DeWeerth in light of its predecessors reveals an
emerging judicial sensitivity to such concerns. This trend in turn echoes
the increasing conservatism of federal law regarding title claims against
cultural property sold or residing in the United States.
8. ANALYSIS OF DEWEERTH
8.1. Choice of Law: Preference for Domestic over Foreign
The first question faced by the DeWeerth court was which law to
apply, that of Germany, where the alleged theft occurred (and the
cause of action thus accrued)'0 2 or that of New York, where the paint-
ing was sold to Baldinger. In Elicofon, 03 the court had also faced a
97 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
" DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106.
" Id. at 112.
100 Id.
101 "Where, as here, the issue is the application of a legal standard - 'reasonable
diligence' - to a set of facts, review is de novo." Id. at 110.
102 For a thorough treatment of the accrual concept in statutes of limitations, with
special reference to cases involving stolen art, see Comment, The Recovery of Stolen
Art, supra note 4, at 1128-32.
103 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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choice between United States and German law. Elicofon, the'purchaser,
argued that German law should apply and raised as a defense the Ger-
man doctrine of Ersitzung, or repose." ' After considering the legal in-
terests of both countries, 105 the circuit court applied New York's limita-
tions law, holding that because the disputed property had been
transferred to the defendant in New York and the painting had been
there for over thirty years, New York's interest outweighed Ger-
many's.106 Interestingly, the court in Jeanneret, also decided in 1982,
applied New York law although Switzerland was the lex situs of the
actual transfer. 07 The rationale behind the Jeanneret court's choice
was that the parties had reached an oral agreement for the sale in New
York.108 New York courts even before DeWeerth thus seemed eager to
apply domestic law to disputes surrounding cultural property. 0°
Presumably, domestic law is more apt to favor United States inter-
104 Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 845 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); see Comment, International Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36, at 195
n.99.
105 Comment, International Law in Domestic Forums, supra note 36, at 195-96.
108 Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160; see also Comment, International Law in Domestic
Forums, supra note 36, at 196 n.101 and accompanying text.
10 See supra note 72. Although Jeanneret involved a breach of warranty claim
rather than suit for recovery of a stolen work as in DeWeerth and Elicofon, in each case
the Second Circuit was obliged to consider domestic policy regarding the application of
foreign laws before choosing to apply United States (state) law, as the court did in all
three instances.
108 The district court and the appellate court agreed that, since the issue inJean-
neret was that of good title, the applicable law was that of the nation in which the
contract was made. Comment, Evaporating the Cloud, supra note 49, at 1012 n. 90.
However, one commentator has asserted that each court's approach contravened the
"conflict of laws principle that the lex situs of the cultural property at the time of
transfer determines whether an innocent purchaser has acquired a valid title from the
transferor." Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 301 (emphasis
added). Moreover, "New York's choice of law dictates that questions relating to the
validity of a transfer of personal property are governed by the law of the state where
the property is located at the time of the alleged transfer." Jeanneret, 693 F.2d at 266,
quoted in id. at 304. Thus the courts should have treated the determination of lex situs
as a question of fact before reaching the merits of the case, rather than accepting the
parties' assumption that New York law should control. Note, Sales of Illegally Ex-
ported Art, supra note 49, at 304.
109 The often-cited case of Menzel v. List may be regarded as first in the line of
proceedings to recover lost artworks through courts seated in New York. The plaintiff
in Menzel brought an action in state court against the good-faith purchaser of a paint-
ing plaintiff had lost during World War II. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 302, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804,
807 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The court applied New York law in deciding the merits of the
case, rejecting the defendant's contention that Menzel's suit was barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 304-05, 267 N.Y.S. 2d at 809.
Because the exercise of diversity jurisdiction had brought DeWeerth, like Elicofon
and Jeanneret, to the Second Circuit, New York state law controlled. DeWeerth, 836
F.2d at 106 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
Thus Menzel, to the extent that it had not been superseded by later decisions, repre-
sented mandatory authority on issues including choice of law.
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ests, although as seen in McClain"l0 and in Jeanneret,' this presump-
tion has not always held true in cases dealing with the international
movement of cultural property. However, the seemingly anomalous re-
sults reached in cases like McClain and Jeanneret may be because of
the operation of law at two levels: first, the overarching claim (traffick-
ing in stolen property in McClain, breach of warranty of title in Jean-
neret), and second, the underlying allegation of a "wrong" defined by
foreign law (e.g., the supposed "theft" in McClain and the export vio-
lation in Jeanneret).
In a case like DeWeerth, only one level of legal wrong is at issue.
Because the parties in DeWeerth assumed that the Monet had probably
been stolen in the traditional sense.. 2 from its rightful owner, the issue
of conflicts of law played little role in the decision. The relative sim-
plicity of the legal claim in such a case therefore highlights the out-
come-determinative role of the controlling law. Resolving this type of
dispute in accordance with United States law, rather than foreign doc-
trines, gives the court much greater freedom to shape policy; the malle-
able nature of United States law (and common law in general) allows
the court to mold it to serve domestic interests.
8.2. Benefit to Commerce in New York Statute of Limitations Law
Looking to New York law in the first instance then, the DeWeerth
court observed that the prevailing rule dictated .hat New York's statute
of limitations be applied to actions accruing within the state, while ac-
tions accruing outside New York might be subject to a "borrowed" lim-
itations period.' In any case, the borrowed period would apply only if
it was shorter than the New York prescription of three years." 4
This "borrowing" rule, though certainly developed outside the art-
market context of DeWeerth, afforded the benefits of sound commercial
policy to the defendant-purchaser in that case. Baldinger was a citizen
of New York and had acquired title to the disputed Monet in a trans-
action occurring in New York. Either circumstance would have allowed
her to be sued in a New York court. 15 There she would be granted the
same degree of repose from claims against her title to the Monet
whether the "cause of action" had technically arisen in New York or in
110 See supra note 1.
... Supra notes 49-72, and accompanying text.
111 Cf supra note 1.
113 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106.
114 Id.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (granting diversity jurisdiction to federal courts).
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another jurisdiction." 6 As DeWeerth illustrates, New York's limitations
law adopts a flexible approach likely to protect those who do busi-
ness-including the purchase and sale of art-in New York.,
17
8.3. Extension of the Demand and Refusal Rule Regarding Accrual
The DeWeerth court thus determined that, whether the cause of
action had accrued in New York or in Germany, DeWeerth's suit
would be barred if not brought within three years of that accrual.1 "
The next issue for the court to determine was when DeWeerth's cause
of action had accrued, or when she had achieved standing to bring suit
for replevin of the missing Monet. While the applicable New York
statute 19 specifies three years as the time limit for bringing such ac-
tions, the presence of the events necessary to do so is largely a question
for judicial discretion.
1 20
Under the "demand and refusal" rule of Menzel v. List,1 21 courts
applying New York law computed the period of limitations in actions
to recover stolen property (and, specifically, works of art) not from the
moment of the alleged theft, but from the time the former owner de-
manded return and the current owner refused.1 12 The requirement had
18 See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text (discussing DeWeerth court's
treatment of concept of accrual); see also DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106.
7 In the world of commerce and trade, [statutes of limitations on actions for
replevin of personal property] provide stability by assuring that those who have dealt in
good faith with property will be made secure in their possession after a certain period
of time. In this way the statutes reduce uncertainty and promote free trade of goods.
Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1128; see also supra note 15.
118 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 113; see supra note 108, and accompanying text.
119 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1972).
120 See Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1129.
... 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), affd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969); see generally Note, Title Disputes in the Art
Market, supra note 4, at 451-52; Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4,
at 1133-36; see also supra note 109.
122 Generally, a cause of action for replevin of stolen property accrues "at the time
of the wrongful taking," so that the statute of limitations begins running against the
would-be plaintiff even if he or she has no idea of the location of the property or the
identity of the defendant. Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1131-
32. An exception to the general rule is recognized where the property has been wrong-
fully concealed. However, some scholars have pointed out that the traditionally private
nature of the art world, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, and "the nature of
possession of fine art" in practical terms makes fraudulent concealment "in many cases
virtually indistinguishable from open, good faith possession, which itself necessarily in-
volves some concealment." Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at
1131 n.36; see O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979), rev'd 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980) (statute of limitations held not to
have begun running against former owner of allegedly stolen paintings until possessor
had satisfied requirement of open and notorious possession by exhibiting paintings pub-
licly). See generally Ward, The Georgia Grind: Can the Common Law Accommodate
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probably been conceived in order to protect the purchaser from suit
without notice; 2 ' under the Menzel rule he or she became liable only
after being alerted to the tainted provenance of the property and being
afforded an opportunity to return it. However, the rule's practical effect
could benefit the claimant more than the good faith purchaser. The
latter remained vulnerable to suit and to a consequent judgment requir-
ing him or her to forfeit honestly bought property until the claimant
chose to exercise his or her right to make demand."2 4
the Problems of Title in the Art World - Observations on a Recent Case, 8 J.C. &
U.L. 533 (Fall 1981); Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 455-56
(discussing case and commending O'Keeffe court's advocacy of "discovery rule"
whereby "a cause of action does not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by the
'exercise of due diligence' should have discovered, the facts constituting the basis of his
action"); cf. CPIA § 312(2), 19 U.S.C. 2611(2) (requirements for publication, etc., of
artworks acquired by United States museums and like institutions, in order to exempt
the works from embargo or seizure under the Act).
Cf. also H.R. 2389, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and S. 1523, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985) (proposed federal Cultural Property Repose Act, protecting United States
museums from suits to reclaim cultural property where museum met certain require-
ments as to duration of possession and nature of publication and display of objects).
Significantly, in 1986 such a proposal was passed by the state legislature of New York,
although the bill was ultimately vetoed by the governor. Museum Repose Vetoed in
Albany, 7 IFAR REPORTS, July/Aug. 1986, at 3, cited in Nafziger, supra note 23, at
251.
2 . See, e.g., Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874) ("[A]n innocent purchaser of
personal property from a wrong-doer shall first be informed of the defect in his title,
and have an opportunity to deliver the property to the true owner, before he shall be
made liable as a tortfeasor.") (emphasis in original), quoted in Comment, The Recov-
ery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1134-35); Atlas Assurance Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn.
188, 195, 183 A. 690, 693 (1936), cited in Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art,
supra note 4, at 1138 n.66.
124 It has been suggested that the applicable New York statute, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L.
& R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1972), directs the limitations period for replevin actions to
begin running as soon as the claimant has a right to make demand, not when the
claimant actually makes demand. See, e.g., Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art,
supra note 4, at 1136-37; see also Federal Insurance Co. v. Fries, 78 Misc. 2d 805,
810, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741, 747 (Civ. Ct. 1974); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. practice com-
mentary 206:1 (McKinney 1972), cited in DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107
n.3 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). Indeed, a literal reading of the
statute, which states that an action requiring demand accrues "when the right to make
the demand is complete," supports that interpretation. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. §
206(a) (McKinney 1972).
However, the DeWeerth court, relying on Menzel and Elicofon, held the require-
ment of demand on a good faith purchaser to be a substantive element of the plaintiff's
cause of action for recovery. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 n.3. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the statute did not begin running until the requirement had been satisfied. Id.;
see also Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 453-54 (Elicofon
decision, applying Menzel rule to allow plaintiff museum to avoid having its action
barred by New York's statute of limitations, is consonant with Uniform Commercial
Code's policy of placing burden of loss on party who "takes from the wrongdoer").
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8.4. Announcement of the Due Diligence Rule
Observing this possible unfairness in the operation of the demand
and refusal rule, the DeWeerth court stated that the claimant in such a
case was under a legal obligation to avoid unreasonable delay in mak-
ing demand. 25 In support of its conclusion, the court cited Elicofon,
among other cases. 2 The DeWeerth court then took the equitable no-
tion of timely action 27 a step further, imposing a "substantive require-
ment" of timely demand on the plaintiff at bar.128 "This rule, focusing
on the plaintiff's conduct, conceptually starts the limitations period at
the point where the plaintiff has had an opportunity to use due dili-
gence in locating the property and making a demand, and has failed to
d o SO .
'129
The court's interpretation of the ban on unreasonable delay in
Menzel-type cases represents DeWeerth's major precedential signifi-
cance. That the plaintiff's claim was ultimately found barred by the
statute of limitations is less important than the court's articulation of its
central inquiry: "Whether New York law imposes upon a person who
claims ownership of stolen personal property an obligation to use due
diligence in attempting to locate the property." 3 '
8.4.1. Legal Reasoning Underlying the Due Diligence Rule
To reach an affirmative answer, the DeWeerth court adopted a
rather novel approach to the concept of accrual. The discussion of this
issue, found in footnotes to the court's opinion,1 3' relies on a certain
125 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107. As this Comment goes to press, the New York
Court of Appeals has, however, reinterpreted the "due diligence" rule. In Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990), affd,
N.Y.2d , N.E.2d , N.Y.S.2d , No. 3 (N.Y. Feb. 14, 1991) (WESTLAW WL
17119, New York Cases data base), wherein the Guggenheim Museum sued an indi-
vidual purchaser of a Chagall gouache allegedly stolen from the museum's collection,
the court dismissed the purchaser's statute of limitations defense based on DeWeerth
and affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff's due diligence in searching for the stolen artwork goes not to
the statute of limitations but, rather, forms part of a laches defense.
126 Id.
12 The judge-made requirement of avoiding unreasonable delay surely derives
from principles of equity. Nevertheless, the opinion in DeWeerth clarified, "While this
proscription against unreasonable delay has been referred to as 'laches,' the New York
courts have explained that the doctrine refers solely to an unexcused lapse of time and
not to the equitable principle of laches, which requires prejudice to the defendant as
well as delay." 836 F.2d at 107 (citations omitted); see also id. at 110.
128 Id. at 107 n.4.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 107.
131 Id. at 107 nn.3, 4.
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amount of legal legerdemain to establish a foundation for imposing a
"due diligence" requirement on DeWeerth. With the help of prece-
dents, including Menzel v. List, the court placed a somewhat strained
interpretation on the clear wording of the applicable New York stat-
ute.132 The DeWeerth argument first echoes Menzel in characterizing
the requirement of demand on good faith purchasers as a "substantive"
element - and thus a prerequisite to accrual - of a cause of action for
the return of stolen personal property. 13  Based on this reasoning,
DeWeerth was allowed to escape the strictures of statutory language
that on its face seems to start the limitations period as soon as the de-
fendant acquires the disputed property, whether or not the plaintiff
knows whom to sue.1
3 4
The court then continued by explaining its distinction between the
statutory limitations period and that "reasonable" time granted a plain-
tiff like DeWeerth to bring suit.' 35 The court concluded that the former
should be strictly applied "only where the demand requirement is pro-
cedural." In cases such as DeWeerth where demand is a substantive
requisite,136 the "unreasonable delay rule" also applies "as a substan-
tive requirement.'1 3 7 Having extracted from precedent this "unreasona-
ble delay" bar to actions against good-faith purchasers, the court then
used it as a basis for the new "due diligence" requirement. 38
DeWeerth's elaborate construction of the New York statute of lim-
itations thus rests on the ill-defined dichotomy between "substantive"
and "procedural" elements of the cause of action. Clearly, the
DeWeerth court took full advantage of its judicial prerogatives by graft-
ing common law doctrines onto statutory formulations in order to reach
a desired result."3 9
8.4.2. Policy Underlying the Due Diligence Rule
The "due diligence" rule is intended to advance the original pur-
pose of the demand and refusal rule - protection of the good-faith
purchaser - and to eliminate the incidental anomaly of leaving the
13 See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1972).
13 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 n.3.
134 Id. See generally Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at
1128-30 (vague statutes of limitations in many states leave presence of facts or events
constituting accrual to be determined by courts; "the vast majority of states specifically
hold that a lawsuit may be filed and maintained even though the identity of the defend-
ant is unknown").
135 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 n.4.
136 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
137 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 n.4.
138 Id.
"' See supra text following note 124.
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purchaser indefinitely vulnerable to suit. 40 The DeWeerth standard
achieves this goal by imposing stringent requirements on a plaintiff
seeking to nullify the legitimate purchase of a work of art."4 Under
DeWeerth, the former owner must not merely avoid "sleeping on his
rights" once the property has been located and its possessor identified;
he must also take affirmative steps to find and contact the possessor as
soon as possible after discovering the loss."4 2
The court of appeals found that DeWeerth, although she had ini-
tiated several inquiries about the lost Monet following the War, 43 had
not exercised sufficient diligence in her search. Reversing the district
court's holding, the Second Circuit deemed the plaintiff's, suit time-
barred and thereby effectively granted quiet title to Baldinger, the
good-faith purchaser. Hence, the actual operation of the new "due dili-
gence" rule in DeWeerth proved as harsh to the theft victim as if the
court had found her claim barred under a literal reading of the statute
of limitations.1
4 4
9. IMPACT OF DEWEERTH
9.1. Implications of DeWeerth for Art Market Transactions
The DeWeerth doctrine places too great a burden of investigation
I'l See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108-09 ("obligation to attempt to locate stolen
property is consistent with New York's treatment of the good-faith purchaser"). The
court observed that the policies underlying the demand-refusal rule "would be frus-
trated if plaintiffs were free to delay actions for the return of stolen property until the
property's location fortuitously came to their attention." Id. at 109.
141 The DeWeerth rule protects a sale of art where the purchase transaction itself
was legitimate, whether or not the provenance of the work was untainted. See infra
text accompanying notes 154-58. This approach views in isolation each transaction in
the chain of possession of the work of art. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
142 See supra note 135. The application of a "discovery rule" in actions for re-
plevin of stolen art work would achieve similar results, taking into account both parties'
interests. See Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1149-52. Propo-
nents of the discovery rule have not gone as far as the court in DeWeerth in requiring
that the victim must take expeditious action to locate the missing art. One observer has
suggested that guidelines for applying the discovery rule (in which the statute of limita-
tions would begin running only after the plaintiff has learned the relevant facts sur-
rounding the fate of his property) should include, but not be limited to, the following:
"(1) [T]he nature of the injury; (2) the availability and quality of witnesses and physi-
cal evidence; (3) the lapse of time since the initial wrongful act; (4) whether the cir-
cumstances permit the inference that the delay has been intentional or deliberate; and
(5) whether the delay has unusually prejudiced the defendant." Id. at 1152.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
144 At trial DeWeerth's counsel had argued that "no New York court has ever
held that the unreasonable delay rule applies before the plaintiff has learned the iden-
tity of the person to whom demand must be made." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 (em-
phasis in original).
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on the plaintiff, leaving the purchaser free to traffic in stolen art as
long as she remains ignorant. The court's opinion may not encourage
the private connoisseur to inquire deeply into the provenance of each
piece she buys.145 However, in rendering its decision, the DeWeerth
court stressed the particular facts of the case. 46 The court felt that be-
cause DeWeerth was a sophisticated collector it was not unreasonable
to expect her to have pursued a more rigorous investigation into the
Monet's whereabouts.147 Presumably, future New York courts would
145 Regarding the varying obligations to investigate title which art sellers and pur-
chasers may have under the U.C.C., depending on such factors as merchant status or
mere familiarity with commerce in art, see Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at
61 n.56; Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 307-09.
In Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979), affd, 53 N.Y.2d
696, 421 N.E.2d 500, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1981), a New York court did in fact hold that
art merchants have some duty, implicit in their observance of "reasonable commercial
standards," to investigate title in order to be considered good-faith purchasers under the
U.C.C. and, therefore, to qualify for certain protections under the Code. See the discus-
sion of this case in Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 445-50.
Compare the obligations on institutional purchasers imposed by the CPIA, summarized
in Nafziger, supra note 23, at 256. Professor Nafziger's discussion of the policies and
law of repose in the context of the international art trade is also illuminating. See
generally id.; cf. also Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 450
("[T]he most effective incentive for investigating title before purchasing art from an
unknown seller is the potential for losing an art work to the owner from whom it was
stolen and being left with no way to recover the investment.").
146 See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110 ("The question of what constitutes unreasona-
ble delay in making a demand that starts the statute of limitations depends upon the
circumstances of the case.").
1,1 Citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (1979), the court
stated that "when the property is valuable art, the search efforts that may reasonably
be expected of an owner may be more exacting than where the property is of a different
kind or of a lesser value." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110. It then continued to rely on a
diligence standard deduced from Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d
1150 (2d Cir. 1982) to show that DeWeerth's search had been inadequate. DeWeerth,
836 F.2d at 111-12.
In particular, the court found "inexcusable" DeWeerth's failure to consult the
Wildenstein Catalogue Rdisonni of Monet's work, where her nephew quickly and eas-
ily found clues to the picture's current location. It may be said, however, in DeWeerth's
favor, that although the painting was recorded and its provenance documented (though
sketchily) in an easily accessible reference work, the Wildenstein Catalogue Raisonng
was not published until 1974 - thirty years after DeWeerth's loss. Moreover, as the
district court had recognized, earlier published references to Champs de Bl were not
widely known to private individuals; an elderly woman might well not "be expected to
mount the sort of investigation undertaken by the government-owned art museum in
Elicofon." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 122 (citing DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694-95).
In any case, the difficulties involved in tracing the whereabouts of objets d'art
should not be underestimated. Many an art historian has built her reputation by docu-
menting "lost" artworks, after long and assiduous research. The considerable obstacles
faced by those searching for "undiscovered masterpieces" (which are often simply
housed in unpublicized private collections) are illustrated by the problems scholars have
had in establishing and coordinating an international archive to help locate stolen art.
What efforts have been successful have been quite useful, yet many more hurdles re-
main for those who would maintain a comprehensive record of the international move-
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be more lenient in the case of a claimant unfamiliar with the art world
and having little idea of what channels to pursue in searching for a
missing painting.1 4
. The "due diligence" rule represents a judicial attempt to strike a
just and realistic balance between the responsibilities of the claimant
and the purchaser in the art market. 4 As noted above, the new rule
protects the bona fide purchaser from indefinite exposure to suit, yet
affords the claimant a fair chance to bring her case into court.'50 The
DeWeerth court recognized that the private nature of art ownership
makes it impossible for the art theft victim to learn the whereabouts of
property without some sleuthing effort.1 ' On the other hand, the court
asserted, because works of art like DeWeerth's painting are
nonfungible, readily recognizable objects, "the owner of stolen art has a
better chance than most owners of stolen property in tracking down the
ment of cultural property. See Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at
458-63 & notes (describing existing resources for investigating title to art works, and
problems attending the functioning of such resources); see also 2 J. MERRYMAN & A.
EISEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 2-109 (1979); Feldman & Burnham, An
Art Theft Archive: Principles and Realization, 10 CONN. L. REv. 702 (1978). See
generally L. DuBOFF, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 51 (1984) (describing International
Art Registry, Inc., a service which, for a fee, provides certificates of authenticity and
title to works of fine art, in addition to helping finance acquisitions).
Cf UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(a) (whereby parties undertake "to oblige an-
tique dealers, subject to penal or administrative sanctions, to maintain a register record-
ing [the origin, description, and fate] of each item sold and to inform the purchaser of
the cultural property of the export prohibition to which such property may be sub-
ject"). This provision of the Convention, tellingly, was not included in the OPIA and
therefore not adopted by the United States. Cf also S. 1619, 100th Congress, 1st Sess.
§ 3(e) (1987) (registration procedures contemplated by proposed Visual Artists' Rights
Act, unenacted); Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at 75-
76 & n.148 (recently implemented New York state regulations of art trade, though
more stringent than old law, still do not require art dealers and auctioneers to maintain
registers detailing provenance and export certification of artworks). But see Note, Title
Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 444-50 (standards of good faith for art
merchants should include title verification).
148 See supra note 141. Interestingly, the DeWeerth court says nothing of its ex-
pectations regarding Baldinger, the victorious defendant. Presumably the court consid-
ered Baldinger, as a private collector, justified in relying on what assurances Wilden-
stein had given her regarding good title to the Monet. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105.
The record does not disclose whether she was as "wealthy and sophisticated" as
DeWeerth, and the opinion does not indicate what impact her level of familiarity with
the art world had on her duty (if any) to investigate title to the painting she had
purchased. Cf Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 61 n.56 (discussing bearing
of purchaser's position on outcome of art market dispute under the U.C.C.).
149 See supra note 141.
150 See generally Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4 (statutes of
limitations must balance defendant's interest in repose against ability of plaintiff to
have meritorious claim heard in court).
151 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109; cf. Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra
note 4, at 1131 n.36, 1147 (indicating problems in establishing any "standard of open-
ness" of possession of fine art).
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item he has lost."11 52
The value of a stolen art object even on the illicit market lies not
in the materials of which it is composed, but in its aesthetic merits or
its historical or cultural significance."5 ' Because the object's value is
thus related to its very uniqueness, it is in the seller's own interest to
preserve the object in its original state. The object will indeed be easily
identifiable once seen.154 The DeWeerth court is therefore correct in
postulating the relative obviousness of an artwork's passage through the
public market.
However, fair application of the DeWeerth standard will require
that courts bear in mind that most art sales occur not on the auction
floor but through private parties. As observed above, even legitimate
artworld transactions are conducted in some secrecy.' 55 Once the art is
sold, furthermore, it may seldom be seen by anyone except the ultimate
purchaser. In addition to the private nature of ordinary use of a work
of art, not all artworks offered for public display are accepted by insti-
tutions mounting exhibitions.'1
6
152 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
153 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
' See Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 36, at 836 & n.7 (rec-
ognizability of a unique and valuable piece "seems to increase the vulnerability of art to
future attack by thieves and vandals [but] also constitutes its strongest defense").
155 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 91-92; infra note 160.
156 See Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1147 ("Even if
suitable display space were available among the rather limited group of 'major metro-
politan galleries and museums,' the standard of openness contemplated by [the court's
opinion in O'Keeffe v. Snyder] glosses over the undeniable fact that not all works of all
artists - even many works of considerable value - merit museum display."); cf
CPIA § 302(2)(C)(ii), 19 U.S.C. 2601 (embodying policy of avoiding export restric-
tions on archaeological or ethnological material that may be of cultural value but lacks
"distinctive characteristics, comparative rarity" or significant contribution to knowledge
about the people that produced it).
The defendant in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (1979),
an action for replevin of a stolen painting, had claimed title to the picture by adverse
possession and averred that the owner's claim was barred by the relevant statute of
limitations. The appellate court held that the statute would be tolled only when a de-
fendant had satisfied all of the elements of adverse possession, but that Snyder's posses-
sion had not been "open and notorious." Id. at 84, 405 A.2d at 846. His failure to meet
this requirement was predicated on the fact that the disputed painting had been on
public display only once during the time the defendant and the painting's previous
owner - his father, who had given him the work - had possessed it. See id. at 80,
405 A.2d at 842; Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art, supra note 4, at 1146 &
nn.103-04.
The DeWeerth court declined to follow O'Keeffe's example by imposing a duty of
"open and notorious possession" on good faith purchasers. But see DeWeerth, 836 F.2d
at 112 (noting that the Monet had in fact been published and exhibited, although
briefly, in New York since its disappearance from Germany; therefore, the court stated
rather harshly that had DeWeerth "undertaken the most minimal investigation during
this period, she would very likely have discovered the Monet"). The DeWeerth opinion
did, however, cite O'Keeffe in support of its imposing a "duty of reasonable investiga-
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
The DeWeerth court implicitly recognized this problem as the due
diligence standard by which it decided DeWeerth's standing to sue in-
cluded no requirement of significant public display whereby she might
have been alerted to the location of Champs de blb. 157 This lenient
stance regarding openness of possession parallels the CPIA's approach
to good faith purchasers of cultural property. For example, section
312(2) provides that cataloguing or publication, not necessarily display
of the cultural object itself, can suffice to exempt objects acquired by a
public institution from seizure or other remedies under the Act.1
58
9.2. Possible Effect of DeWeerth on Art Market Regulation
The effect of DeWeerth will be to protect good faith purchasers in
the vitally important New York art market'59 and to diminish legal
battles among its participants. Although the DeWeerth opinion does not
suggest that professional art dealers have no obligation to maintain
honest and fair dealings in their trade by investigating the provenance
of artworks they buy and sell,' the "due diligence" rule, as discussed
tion," in addition to the demand and refusal requirement, on current possessors subject
to a statute of limitations. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
'57 See supra note 95.
158 CPIA § 312(2), 19 U.S.C. 2611. Only publicly owned museums are within the
scope of the CPIA at all. See Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra
note 14, at 64-65 (noting that Convention governs only nationally controlled institutions
and that Congress intends art dealers to be governed by state law rather than federal);
cf. CPIA § 307, 19 U.S.C. 2606 (limiting scope of State Party's ability to invoke Cus-
toms restrictions on cultural property to documented objects).
15I See DeWeerth 836 F.2d at 109 (noting that the duty of reasonable diligence,
among other benefits, serves the policy of protecting good-faith purchasers).
160 For an argument against the common art market practice of requiring docu-
mentation of provenance before concluding a sale, see Note, Sales of Illegally Exported
Art, supra note 49, at 281-82:
The trade usage that reputable art dealers must document title and prove-
nance in order to sell on the legitimate market is therefore legally super-
fluous - a self-imposed restriction that does not reflect legal necessity. It
is not required to protect buyers or sellers from foreign governments
which, barring treaty, are unable to force the return of works from beyond
their borders and should be unable to confiscate them within.
Compare the discussion of Jeanneret v. Vichey, supra text accompanying notes 49-79.
In practice, the respected legitimate art dealer usually does offer a potential pur-
chaser some documentation of the given work's provenance, or at least offers to produce
documentation on request. The offer is made as a show of good faith, as much to assure
the buyer of the quality of the pedigreed artwork as of the legality and finality of his
purchase. However, unless the purchaser is especially savvy or insistent, he will receive
only the dealer's representations and selected "proof" as to the artwork's history.
Though often the provenance is thoroughly documented and virtually unimpeachable, it
may also be sketchy or speculative as a result of the dealer's own lack of knowledge.
For example, large and well-known commercial galleries, whom the lay consumer may
be more likely to trust than a smaller concern or an individual, commonly buy or con-
sign works of art via "runners," or private, free-lance dealers. Their dealings may in
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above, places an onerous burden on the plaintiff seeking to challenge
the legitimacy of an art purchase, regardless of the legitimacy of the
work's provenance. Because this burden applies where a work of art
was believed to have been stolen (in the commonly accepted sense),"1"
as in DeWeerth itself, one might comfortably speculate that New York
courts would be even less willing to penalize the good faith purchaser
- whether a private collector or a museum - in a case where a for-
eign sovereign bases a claim to title on self-declared ownership. 2 Still
fact be perfectly legitimate, but the runners are frequently loath to divulge the sources
of their wares. See Grimes, supra note 19, at 24.
The secrecy associated with art market transactions results from tradition, from
privacy interests, and - probably most important - from the desire by all parties to
avoid taxation. In addition, provenance before very recent years is often difficult to
trace accurately, due to the notorious informality of many art transactions. See id.
Moreover, these transactions may be nonetheless complex and involve parties in several
countries. It seems realistic to assume that all these compelling factors will continue to
operate, making meaningful legal regulation of the art world difficult if not virtually
impossible. See Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 61 & n.55 (galleries and
auction houses "often unwittingly facilitate fraud because of the casual nature in which
they conduct business and the amorphous methods of authentication they utilize"). The
most effective guarantee of honesty and good faith in the art trade will remain the
danger of a dealer's losing her reputation - and her business - should legal wrangles
develop over good title to pieces she has sold. Cf. supra note 53 (inability of art
merchant to vend on the legitimate market a painting stigmatized by questionable title).
Nevertheless, numerous commentators, scholars, and legislators continue to ad-
vance a variety of possible means to demystify and regulate the commercial art trade.
See Glueck, New York Studies Regulating Art Sales Like Commodities, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1991, at C9, col. 1; Mullarkey, Price Affixing, The Nation, Apr. 30, 1988, at
592 (advocating control of art galleries under New York consumer protection laws);
Note, Sales of Illegally Exported Art, supra note 49, at 318-19 (suggesting amend-
ments to Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, to clarify consequences of dealing in
illegally exported art); Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 458-63
(advocating use of art-theft archives to aid in policing illicit art traffic and describing
measures currently underway); Id., at 444 n.8 (citing recent state-level legislation to
regulate art market); Id. at 449 n.45 (museum and commercial self-regulation and pro-
posals for external controls); Comment, Regulation of the New York Art Market: Has
the Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 939 (1978)
(attempts by New York legislature to regulate art trade); Feldman & Burnham, supra
note 147 (discussing efforts of International Foundation for Art Research to curb illegal
art trade and the general efficacy of art registries); Du Boff, Controlling the Artful
Con: Authentication and Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973 (1976) (consumer protec-
tion mechanisms can be used in investigating art transactions; other measures such as
dealer certification would also be valuable). But see, e.g., Kramer, The Case Against
Price Tags on Art, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at H33, col. 1 (arguing against regula-
tion of art galleries as ordinary retailers). One London art dealer has acknowledged:
"[Ojutside regulators could create as many problems as they solve - they may not know
the market well enough. Ideally, self-regulation is better. But if a dominant firm
stretches the unwritten norms of the past, [self-regulation] may not be enough."
Hughes, supra note 4, at 63.
161 Compare discussion of United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.
1977), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977), and United States v. McClain, 593
F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979), supra note I and accompanying text.
16 See discussion of McClain, supra note 1. But cf. Autocephalous Greek-Ortho-
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less promising would be the case where a plaintiff based his claim to
title on a violation of a foreign export regulation intended to secure the
exporting country control of what it considers "national patrimony." 16 3
Such enhanced protection of good-faith buyers will doubtless benefit the
United States economically by stabilizing art transactions and thereby
encouraging sales in New York, the national hub of the art trade.
1 4
10. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT TREND IN UNITED STATES
POLICY
The policy underlying both DeWeerth and the CPIA encourages
the private resolution of title disputes over works of art." 5 In addition
dox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990).
13 Cf Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 76 ("International cooperation
in regulating the illicit movement of cultural property is more readily apparent with
regard to 'stolen' goods as opposed to 'illegally exported' goods.").
164 One possible problem with the more relaxed policy recently evinced by Con-
gress and the courts is the danger of the United States art market becoming a "laun-
dry" for artworks of unclean title. See id. at 75 n.131 ("[T]he United States has been
called a 'dumping ground' for stolen art."); cf. Nafziger, supra note 23, at 251 (noting
that opponents of federal legislation impeding foreign claims for the return of cultural
property "would convert the United States into a pirate's cove for contraband arti-
facts"); S. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 129 (stating that the United States pre-CPIA,
laissez-faire policy made "[tihe United States . . . the largest market for stolen or ille-
gal[ly] exported cultural property [in the world]"). Indeed, this type of concern led to
the harsh measures adopted during the 1970s in the United States' efforts to curb traf-
fic in looted art and antiquities. See supra notes 11, 35-36, 39 and accompanying text.
However, as many critics of overbroad restrictions on the international art trade
have noted, unilateral action by the United States will only drive the black market -
and the legitimate market - elsewhere, leaving the United States economically disad-
vantaged. See McAlee, The McClain Case, supra note 1, at 814. It is apparently this
realization that has caused the political pendulum to return from a position of great
deference to the claims of art-exporting countries to one of evincing more concern for
the rights and concerns of parties to United States art transactions. See supra text
accompanying notes 19-21.
16" Not only will the "due diligence" rule operate to curb extensive litigation by
barring many claims from going forward, but the decision seems calculated to promote
private dispute resolution. The "due diligence" rule represents a doctrinal extension of
the "demand and refusal" rule, which itself added to ordinary limitations law a re-
quirement that the parties deal with each other directly (the prospective plaintiff re-
questing her property and the potential defendant making a reply) before a cause of
action may be found. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
Indeed, since the initial submission of this Comment for publication, the "due
diligence" rule seems to have worked the predicted effect in at least one highly publi-
cized case. There, a German church filed, and later settled, a suit against the estate of
an American collector, for recovery of certain medieval art treasures and important
manuscripts believed to have been stolen by the collector from Germany during World
War II. See Honan, Those in Art Case May Settle It Themselves, N.Y. Times, July 9,
1990, at C13, col. 1 (discussing "due diligence" requirement); Honan, Looted
Treasures Returning to Germany, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at C11, col. 1 (reporting
settlement reached).
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to the legal, political, and economic soundness of a retreat from overly
zealous enforcement of foreign claims and import restrictions through
legal and administrative means,"6 this new "laissez-faire" policy coin-
cides with the realities of the art trade.167 Using informal diplomatic or
private means to deal with such international conflicts not only saves
adminstrative expense and judicial resources 6' and avoids political ten-
sion,"' 9 but also is more congenial to those accustomed to the traditional
informality of the art trade.1 0 Moreover, as one commentator has
observed:
The efficacy of [the] comprehensive legal framework
[for penalizing illegitimate international trade in cultural
property] is debatable. Its primary effect thus far has not
been so much to punish individuals, but rather to facilitate
the restitution, return, or forfeiture of cultural property, and
to raise public consciousness and respect for the integrity of
cultural provenance and property ownership, whether public
166 See, e.g., P. BATOR, supra note 1, 41-43, 77-78, 90-91 (negative consequences
of enforcing broad export restrictions); S. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 170 (enforce-
ment of overly restrictive export laws inhibits legitimate flow of cultural property and
fosters black market); Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 36, at 846-52
(discussing problems in exercising legal control over illicit movement of cultural prop-
erty); see also Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market, supra note 4, at 444-45 (indicat-
ing free trade policy underlying the U.C.C., adopted in most states). But see Note,
Harmonious Meeting, supra note 1.
167 See, e.g., McAlee, From the Boston Raphael, supra note 1, at 604 (noting the
practical need for reciprocity with United States enforcement of import restrictions on
cultural property). As Congress considered proposed legislation to implement the
UNESCO Convention, arguments before both the House and the Senate stressed that if
the United States were to adopt its provisions while other art-importing nations refused
to do so, the result would "not put an end to world trade in the art which it embargoes
but [would] succeed only in rerouting the flow of such art from the United States to
such countries as Switzerland, West Germany, England, France, and Japan." Id.
(quoting Statement of the American Association of Art Dealers in Ancient, Oriental
and Primitive Art at 20); see also id. at 604 n.177; Comment, The Evolution of Ameri-
can Attitudes, supra note 6, at 633-35 (market vulnerability of United States with
respect to other major art importers).
16' Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 871-73 (citing reasons for critique of United
States Customs Service's overenforcement of embargoes based on foreign export restric-
tions on cultural property); see also, e.g., Honan, Looted Treasures Returning to Ger-
many, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at C11, col. I (chief lawyer for German plaintiffs in
suit for recovery of medieval art in American hands expressed satisfaction with settle-
ment because "the total expense for recovery of all the treasures is less than the sum
originally allocated by the German Government last April for one manuscript from the
hoard, the so-called Samuhel Gospels").
169 See, e.g., Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 36, at 845
("[M]unicipal controls that bar all exports of objets d'art, such as the Mexican system,
create a black market, encourage a cottage industry in forgeries, generate international
tensions, and do little to prevent illegal trafficking in antiquities.") (emphasis added).
17 See supra note 160.
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or private.171
The cooperation among nations and cultural institutions7 2 fostered by
the approach recently adopted by the United States thus presents an
attractive and feasible alternative to complex and problematic interna-
tional litigation or administrative sanctions.1
73
11. FUTURE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW
11.1. Administrative Treatment of Art World Disputes
On the administrative or executive level, observers of cultural
property law await the outcome of requests instituted under the provi-
"ll Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 36, at 846.
172 See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text. Self-regulation by museum
professionals and scholarly institutions has also gained greater currency as a means to
curtail illicit trading in cultural property. See P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 80-90 (dis-
cussing the responsibility of museums to regulate acquisitions with an eye to preventing
illicit trade in cultural property); Note, The Current Status, supra note 1, at 63 n.60
(discussing standards governing art acquisitions, loans, etc., set by museum organiza-
tions and individual institutions); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 n.14
(5th Cir. 1977) (noting numerous museums that have adopted voluntary policy of
prohibiting acquisitions not "accompaned by a pedigree"). The University of Pennsyl-
vania Museum in 1970 was the first to adopt a voluntary policy of ascertaining clear
provenance before acquiring an archaeological or ethnological object for the Museum's
collection. See P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 81 n.144.
173 For a recent example of a compromise that avoided an international legal bat-
tle, see Walker, Warrant for Lee's Arrest Dropped, ART NEws, Summer 1987, at 30.
The government of France had issued an arrest warrant for Sherman Lee, director of
the Cleveland Museum of Art, claiming that the museum's possession of a certain
painting was unlawful. The work, by the celebrated seventeenth-century French
painter Nicolas Poussin, had been removed from France without an export permit.
Although the picture was legally imported into the United States, France claimed that
it had the right to title. The museum, which had purchased the work in good faith from
a French citizen, argued that a certain exception in French law made the export legal.
France disagreed. At last the parties reached a compromise, whereby the museum re-
tains title to the Poussin but will allow it to be displayed in France for part of each
year. Compare Erlanger, Stolen Plaque Is Returned to a Bangkok Museum, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at C17, col. 1 (discussing return of stolen museum piece by gal-
lery owner alerted to its illicit provenance by curator from the Metropolitan Museum
of Art, New York) with Stille, supra note 38, at 33, col. 1 (discussing return, after
acrimonious struggle, of legally acquired sculpture, considered a national treasure, to
Thailand by Art Institute of Chicago, in return for comparable work of Thai art
donated by a private foundation); see also P. BATOR, supra note 1, at 4 n.11 (discuss-
ing discreet return to Italy, by Boston Museum of Fine Arts, of smuggled Raphael).
Cf Note, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact, supra note 14, at 65 (describ-
ing "broad policy statements encouraging international cooperation and assistance in
preserving every nation's cultural heritage" which are included in the 1972 UNESCO
Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural Property and Natural Heri-
tage); MeAlee, From the Boston Raphael, supra note 1, at 593 (noting initial require-
ment of 1970 Mexican-American treaty to request the return of stolen cultural prop-
erty "through diplomatic offices," for "[i]f the nation receiving the request cannot
return the stolen property, it is obliged to institute judicial proceedings for recovery").
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sions of the CPIA by Bolivia and Canada.174 Until 1989, the first and
only action completed by the United States government under the
UNESCO Convention and its implementing legislation was the imposi-
tion of emergency import restrictions on certain pre-Hispanic artifacts
from El Salvador, at that country's request.17 5 Those restrictions were
implemented according to the "emergency" provisions of section 304 of
the CPIA, meaning that the class of objects covered is of high cultural
value to the requesting country and in great jeopardy from "pillage,
dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation. 1 7 8
An interesting question that will perhaps be determined by the
resolution of the Canadian and Bolivian claims is whether use of these
"tcrisis" provisions, whereby the Convention's requirement of multilat-
eral international action is waived, will overtake the ordinary embargo
scheme the CPIA prescribes in section 307.177 If the Cultural Property
Advisory Committee readily accepts an art-exporting nation's own
claims that its patrimony will remain in imminent peril unless the
United States imposes a unilateral ban on imports of a certain class of
cultural property, the regime of McClain will not have been effectively
ended."' 8
11.2. Judicial Treatment of Art World Disputes
The current viability of the McClain doctrine itself may be illumi-
nated by the final disposition of a case pending at this writing in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. In
that case, the United States Customs Service seized certain archaeologi-
cal material from the Setnams, art dealers who had acquired the mate-
174 At the writing of this Comment in 1989, the Cultural Property Advisory Com-
mittee, see CPIA § 306, 19 U.S.C. § 2605, was investigating the Canadian and Boliv-
ian requests. United States Information Agency, Curbing Illicit Trade in Cultural
Property: United States Assistance under the Convention on Cultural Property Imple-
mentation Act 10 (rev. ed. July 1988) [hereinafter USIA booklet] (available from Cul-
tural Property Staff, U.S.I.A., Washington, D.C.).
On Bolivia's efforts to recover cultural property the Bolivian government alleged
had been taken unlawfully from the country, see Stille, supra note 38, at 1, col. 1.
175 See Import Restrictions on Archaeological Materials from El Salvador, 52 Fed.
Reg. 34,616 (1987); USIA booklet, supra note 174, at 9-10.
16 CPIA § 304(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2603.
177 Paul M. Bator, Lecture at Practising Law Institute Program on Art Law,
New York City (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter P. Bator, PLI Lecture].
178 See supra note 1 (discussing McClain); text accompanying notes 36-45 (ob-
serving problems in defining "national patrimony"); cf. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at
871 (noting that current customs policy regarding pre-Columbian artifacts "reflects a
policy that the United States will unilaterally respond to the ownership declarations of
foreign countries" and in doing so "rejects one of the most important underpinnings of
the Cultural Property Law [CPIA] - 'the principle of participation in a concerted
international effort' ").
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rial in Peru and had resold it in the United States.1"9 The government's
arguments in prosecuting the importers for illicit art trafficking rely on
the McClain theory, equating with theft the unlawful exportation of
artwork from a country with title-vesting or forfeiture legislation.18 °
Resolution of the Swetnam case could furnish a more current guidepost
for Customs 81 and for federal courts faced with claims alleging the
illegal importation of stolen national treasures.1 2
Further guidance may also lie in the resolution of a current con-
flict between the Republic of Turkey and New York's Metropolitan
Museum of Art. 83 Turkey sued the Museum seeking the recovery of
ancient Lydian artifacts acquired by the museum "from two respectable
179 In re Seizure of Pre-Columbian Objects and Business Records, No. 21491
(C.D. Cal. complaint filed in 1988), referenced in P. Bator, PLI Lecture, supra note
177. See generally Sward, U.S. Battle Over Peru's Art Treasures, San Francisco
Chronicle, Apr. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (giving a generally objective account of facts in
the case, but reporting that the disputed works were taken from a single burial site in
Peru).
Compare the description of a case in which criminal charges are being brought
against a San Francisco art dealer on behalf of the Bolivian government, seeking return
of garments alleged to be sacred vestments stolen from an Indian village in the Andes,
in Stille, supra note 38, at 1, col. 1. The dealer in that case claimed that he purchased
the textiles legitimately from local villagers. Id. at 1, col. 1.
ISo P. Bator, PLI Lecture, supra note 177. According to Professor Bator, how-
ever, the government's arguments in the pending case are far more attenuated than in
McClain. The prosecution alleges that the provenance of the disputed pre-Columbian
objects is "mysterious," but that they must have been stolen from a number of countries
that could have legal claim to title. Id. (Presumably this hypothesis is based on
archaeological evidence regarding the origins of the objects.) The imported material
would be deemed contraband - and the importer subject to conviction under the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act - on the basis of the material having been taken from any
one of those countries documented as having broad title-vesting or forfeiture statutes,
which might cover the specific objects in question. See Sward, supra note 179, at Al,
col. 3 (tracing a Peruvian provenance of objects and noting Peruvian government's con-
tention that the objects cannot be held privately without permission of Peruvian
government).
For a seminal account of the black market in such pre-Columbian objects, see
Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ART J. 94 (1969).
181 For a description of the United States Customs Service's recent activities with
regard to cultural property, and an argument that these activities contravene national
policy as well as good law, see generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 1.
182 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 875; cf. McAlee, The McClain Case, supra
note 1. Professor Merryman has recently observed: "Right now we have three levels of
policy which are often inconsistent.... We have the Cultural Property Act, we have
the McClain decision, and we have the [C]ustoms [S]ervice policy which bootstraps
McClain." Stille, supra note 38, at 32, col. 4. Professor Fitzpatrick, too, has com-
mented in an interview: "The Cultural Property Act says specifically that the Customs
Service is not supposed to enforce other countries' export laws, but that's what they're
doing. Customs has. . .created a virtual embargo on all pre-Columbian goods." Id. But
cf. Note, Harmonious Meeting, supra note 1.
18 Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 87 Civ. 3750 VLB
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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dealers" during the 1960s." While the Turkish government claimed
that it was unable to make demand previously because the Museum
had concealed the works,1 85 the Museum, citing DeWeerth,"'s asserted
that Turkey's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and moved
for dismissal.1 87 The ultimate disposition of this case, well-known and
closely watched by the art world, will test the viability of both
DeWeerth and McClain.
11.3. Informal/Diplomatic Treatment of Art World Disputes
Finally, a current and highly publicized claim by the Italian gov-
ernment against the J. Paul Getty Museum in California will indicate
the present ability of cultural institutions to settle such claims through
informal channels. Italy complains that an enormous statue, which the
Getty acquired in 1988, rightfully belongs to the Italian government as
part of its national patrimony. The statue, dating to the 6th century
B.C. may represent the Greek goddess Aphrodite. Italy insists that it
was smuggled out of the country after having been excavated at an
illicit dig in Sicily.188
The Getty Museum had conducted a year-long investigation of the
statue's provenance and its lawyers had been informed of no claims to
the statue by Italy's Ministry of Cultural Affairs before completing
purchase from a London dealer.18 9 However, critics assert that the
Getty's investigation of the statue's "murky" provenance was insuffi-
cient.19 For its part, Italy will have to show proof that the statue was
184 Stille, supra note 38, at 32, col. 4 (quoting statement 'by Ashton Hawkins,
General Counsel of the Metropolitan Museum of Art).
185 Cf. supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
le Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 87 Civ. 3750 VLB
(S.D.N.Y.); Brief for Petitioner, referenced in Doreen Small, Lecture at Practising
Law Institute Program on Art Law, New York City (July 15, 1988).
187 Stille, supra note 38, at 32, col. 4. The museum also objected to Turkey's
"misguided" application of "today's collecting standards to yesterday's acquisitions."
Id. at 33, col. 1; cf. McAlee, From the Boston Raphael, supra note 1, at 589-90 (dis-
cussing the problem of after-acquired knowledge in the context of application of the
McClain doctrine).
On July 16, 1990, during the pendency of this Comment's publication, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Museum's
motion for dismissal on the grounds that Turkey had unreasonably delayed its demand
for return of the Lydian objects. Honan,Judge Clears Way for Trial Over Turkish Art
at Met, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at C25, col. 1. The court left for litigation the
issues surrounding Turkey's allegation that the objects were exported from Turkey in
violation of Turkish law, which maintains that the Turkish government holds title to
all artifacts found there. Id.
18 Stille, supra note 79, at 33, col. 3.
188 Id.
L90 Id. (quoting statements made by Thomas Hoving, former director of the Met-
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indeed removed from the illegal Sicilian dig before the government's
legal claim to the Aphrodite can be considered valid. 91 In any event,
both the Getty and the Italian Ministry of Cultural Affairs192 have ex-
pressed the desire to resolve the controversy directly and peacefully.
The Getty Museum asserts that if the Italian claim proves valid, it is
prepared to return the statue, in keeping with the spirit of the
UNESCO Convention.19
12. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to demonstrate that a coherent re-
solve has emerged in the past decade among United States executive
powers, legislators, and courts. This resolve, to avoid protecting the
self-described national patrimony of art-exporting nations at the ex-
pense of domestic commercial interests, is embodied in the terms of the
newly ratified Cultural Property Implementation Act and in the rea-
soning behind the DeWeerth decision. Whether the United States will
carry through the policy these recent examples seem to announce
should become clear within the next few years, as foreign claimants
continue to assert challenges to the good title of cultural property in
American collections.
ropolitan Museum).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 33, col. 4.
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